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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND MEDIA RIGHTS DURING
WARTIME: SOME THOUGHTS AFTER
OPERATION DESERT STORM*
MARK C. RAHDERT**
I. INTRODUCTION
E SPECIALLY in its bicentennial year, it is alluring to think that
the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are simple, direct
and clear. That is, I think, the general perception of the Ameri-
can public, a perception fed by decades of "benign neglect" of
the subject of civil liberties in American public education. Two
centuries of generally stable, prosperous, democratic government
under a single constitution have permitted us to grow so accus-
tomed to our civil liberties that we largely take them for granted.
Our governments-national, state and local-habitually respect
our rights and, for the most part, resist temptations to take them
away. Our courts energetically defend those rights, enforcing
them on those few occasions when governments do overstep the
bounds of freedom delineated by the Bill of Rights.'
The rights themselves have become familiar with long enjoy-
ment. We know, as citizens of the United States, that we have
these rights; we do not fear that they will be taken away. Conse-
quently, we rarely think about these rights guaranteed to us. 2
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a public forum on the Bill
of Rights on March 26, 1991, sponsored by the Free Library of Philadelphia, and
at a forum on June 18, 1991, sponsored by the Temple University Law Alumni-
ae Association. The author is grateful to Tami Traynor and Terry Lohr for their
helpful research assistance, and to the Temple University School of Law for
financial support.
** Professor of Law, Temple University.
1. We, as lawyers, tend to focus on the exceptional occasions where a gov-
ernment oversteps the bounds of permissible regulation and where, therefore,
the courts must block that government action in order to protect civil liberties,
despite, in some cases, strong public sentiment in favor of the curtailment of
protected rights. Among the more prominent recent examples of court-man-
dated protection of first amendment rights are the flag-burning cases, where the
Supreme Court invalidated state and federal attempts to punish symbolic de-
struction of the American flag. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990) (United States may not punish symbolic flag-burning); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (states may not punish symbolic flag-burning). These ex-
amples appear to be, however, the exception rather than the rule. Judicial inter-
vention in this area is generally unnecessary because of the self-regulation of the
legislative and executive branches.
2. A 1989 study conducted by Michael X. Delli Carpini, assistant professor
(1513)
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Such complacency breeds a public perception that the rights
themselves are so clear and so essential that no one could ration-
ally imagine their withdrawal.
A casual glance at the Bill of Rights seems to reinforce the
popular notion of clarity and simplicity. The language is gener-
ally broad, majestic and apparently clear. The Bill of Rights has
been in existence in its pristine form, without change or qualifica-
tion for 200 years. s If ever legal commands were pure, simple,
and easy to follow, these declarations of rights in the first ten
amendments to the Constitution certainly seem to fill that bill. As
any scholar of constitutional law knows, however, behind the
of political science at Barnard College, and Scott Keeter, assistant professor of
political science at Virginia Commonwealth University, found that only 46% of a
cross-section of American adults polled by telephone knew that the first ten
amendments to the Constitution are collectively called the Bill of Rights. Kagay,
Public's Knowledge of Civics Rises Only a Bit, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989, at L30, col.
1, L31, col. 1. Even more disturbing, perhaps, is a 1987 Hearst poll which dis-
closed that "nearly half of Americans believe that the Constitution contains the
Marxist slogan: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his
need.'" Id. Additionally, approximately 64%o of those polled "believed the
framers made English the national language." IM
This apathy for the Constitution, however, is not unique to our generation.
A Gallup poll in 1947 revealed that 41% of those Americans questioned could
not correctly answer the question: "What is the Bill of Rights?" Id.
3. There have been recent rumblings about a constitutional amendment to
withdraw first amendment protection for flag burning. In response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1990), which held
that a state could not punish a protestor who burned the American flag because
flag burning is constitutionally protected speech, Congress drafted The Flag
Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 11 1990) (criminalizing desecra-
tion of American flag). The Court, however, held this statute unconstitutional as
applied to protestors who burned the flag as well. United States v. Eichman, 110
S. Ct. 2404 (1990). In this decision, the Court relied heavily upon its reasoning
in Texas v.Johnson. Id. at 2407-10 (reasoning that Flag Protection Act, like Texas
statute at issue in Johnson, "suppresses expression out of concern for its likely
communicative impact," and therefore must be subjected to "most exacting
scrutiny").
During the drafting of The Flag Protection Act, some members of Con-
gress, including Senators Thurmond, Hatch and Grassley, were of the opinion
that the "most sound and prudent course to protect the integrity of the Ameri-
can flag" was by constitutional amendment. S. REP. No. 152, 101st Cong., Ist
Sess. 18, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 610, 626 (additional
views of Senator Strom Thurmond). They argued-in retrospect, correctly-
that it was "futile to try to overturn [the] Supreme Court interpretation of the
Constitution by a statute." Id. at 24, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 630 (minority views of Senators Hatch and Grassley). Instead, with the
President's backing, they offered a new constitutional amendment which would
provide that "[t]he Congress shall have the power to prohibit the physical dese-
cration of the Flag of the United States." Id. at 27, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 634. The majority of the Congress, however, chose to
adopt the statutory approach and the proposed amendment never came to a
vote.
1514 [Vol. 36: p. 1513
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facade of apparent simplicity lies a maze of complex legal
dilemmas.
Each provision of the Bill of Rights only vaguely defines the
contours of a legal battleground, on which, for 200 years, the bat-
tles of our fundamental freedoms have been fought. ChiefJustice
John Marshall remarked 172 years ago that the nature of a consti-
tutional provision "requires[] that only its great outlines should
be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingre-
dients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature
of the objects themselves. ' 4 He was speaking of the powers of
government enumerated in the body of the Constitution, but his
statement applies just as forcefully to the privileges enumerated
in the Bill of Rights. This deliberate focus by the Framers on
broad outlines necessarily means that much will be left to judicial
interpretation. In the oft-quoted language of Monaco v. Missis-
sippi:5 "Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are pos-
tulates that limit and control."' 6 Thus, judicial weighing of these
(often competing) "postulates" at different times in our nation's
history and in response to the endless variations of human experi-
ence will cause the words of a particular constitutional guarantee
to take on different meanings and bear different significance.
There could be no more pertinent reminder of these juris-
prudential truisms than the constitutional jousting we recently
witnessed between the media and the press on the one hand, and
the military on the other, during "Operation Desert Storm," the
war between the allied nations and Iraq over the liberation of Ku-
wait.7 On the deserts adjacent to the Persian Gulf, the govern-
ment that led the engagement with the Iraqi army over the
borders of Iraq and Kuwait also fought some vigorous skirmishes
with the media over the outer limits of free speech and freedom
of the press. On this latter battleground, there were no decisive
battles. The ultimate cease-fire was more a standoff than a victory
4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (holding that
not all powers delegated to government through Constitution must be by ex-
press delegation; powers may be implied).
5. 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (holding that article III of the Constitution and the
eleventh amendment impliedly bar Court from exercising jurisdiction over suit
brought by foreign state against state of union, unless state consents to be sued).
6. Id. at 322.
7. The chronicles of this military episode are yet to be written. For a rea-
sonably accurate summary of events, see Duffy, The One Hundred Hour War, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Mar. 11, 1991, at 11. For information on the covert
military activities during this war, see Matthews, The Secret History of the War,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1991, at 28; Waller, Secret Warriors, NEWSWEEK, Jun. 17,
1991, at 20.
15151991]
3
Rahdert: The First Amendment and Media Rights during Wartime: Some Thought
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
for either side. There were, however, portents of a coming show-
down to which both sides will send all their troops and go for
broke.8 The purpose of this Article is to muse about the relevant
issues before the next battle cries are sounded.
The first amendment provides, in terms that seem to admit
no uncertainty, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ..... -9 As Justice Hugo
Black repeatedly observed, these words seem to convey, in unmis-
takable terms, that our national government is expressly forbid-
den from doing anything that would interfere with freedom of
speech.' 0 Yet, asJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote for the
Court during World War I: "When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to [the
war] effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight...'. " Thus, the Supreme Court has been forced to recog-
nize that the apparently unbending language of the first amend-
8. See, e.g., Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp.
1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (members of press brought action challenging Defense
Department regulations governing coverage of U.S. armed forces activities over-
seas during periods of hostilities; court held that claims for injunctive relief were
mooted by conclusion of Persian Gulf war and lifting of some regulations).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring) ("The Government's power to censor the press was abol-
ished [by the First Amendment] so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government."); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293
(1963) (Black,J., concurring) ("The requirement that malice be proved provides
at best an evanescent protection for the right to critically discuss public affairs
and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First
Amendment."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black, J., concur-
ring) ("We should never forget that the freedoms secured by that amendment-
Speech, Press, Religion, Petition and Assembly-are absolutely indispensable
for the preservation of a free society in which government is based upon the
consent of an informed citizenry ... ."); Beauharnais v. United States, 343 U.S.
250, 267 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[N]o legislature is charged with the duty
or vested with the power to decide what public issues Americans can discuss.");
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) ("So
long as this Court exercises the power ofjudicial review of legislation, I cannot
agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom
of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere 'rea-
sonableness.' "); American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445
(1950) (BlackJ., dissenting) ("IT]he First Amendment was added after adoption
of the Constitution for the express purpose of barring Congress from using pre-
viously granted powers to abridge belief or expression."); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (Black, J. delivered opinion of Court) ("[T]he First
Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press.' ").
11. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that prosecu-
tion under federal espionage act did not violate defendant's first amendment
rights where defendant had conspired to distribute 15,000 anti-war circulars to
draftees).
1516 [Vol. 36: p. 1513
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ment must be softened during periods of armed conflict in order
to strike a balance between the claims of free speech and the
needs of national security.12
Inevitably, the Court has conceded that the realities of war
necessitate some limitations on the freedom of speech.' 3 The
12. See generally Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 422, 438-40 (1980) (discussing relative merits of balancing ap-
proach to first amendment jurisprudence); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 935 (1963) [hereinafter Emerson, General
Theory] (discussing difficulties inherent in balancing society's interest in freedom
of expression against military's interest in conducting effective operations).
13. The seminal case which gave weight to the military's point of view was
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In dictum, the Court stated that "[n]o
one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to
its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops." Id. at 716. The Near Court paved the way for
later decisions which held that national security or military interests could be the
basis for an infringement on the first amendment. See, e.g., United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968) (punishing burning of draft card did not
infringe upon first amendment rights because "substantial governmental inter-
est" in "smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System" was
sufficient to allow restriction on "noncommunicative" actions); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("mhe different character of the military community
and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections
[of the First Amendment]."); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88
(1985) (rule barring petitioner from a military base to protest war upheld).
The Court has not always, however, deferred to an expressed executive
branch interest in national security. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1970) (per curiam decision) (denying government request
based on grounds of national security for injunctions prohibiting publication of
classified documents on government policy and strategy during Vietnam war).
Nor has Congress.
The Court, in New York Times, held that the Washington Post and New York
Times could not be prohibited from publishing certain classified material, but
the Court was divided as to the scope of its holding. The justices' main point of
disagreement concerned whether, under any circumstances, the Court may en-
join the publication of news to preserve national security. A minority of the
justices argued that any governmental attempt to enjoin the publication of news
is per se unconstitutional under the first amendment. Id. at 715 (Black, J., con-
curring) (permitting publication of news to be enjoined "would make a shambles
of the First Amendment"); id. at 720 (Douglas, J:, concurring) (first amendment
clearly prohibits Congress from imposing restraint on press and it is not neces-
sary to decide "what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have"). In
contrast, a majority of the Court left open the possibility that the publication of
news may be enjoined in certain circumstances. Id. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (while "there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the
First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden," first
amendment does not tolerate "prior judicial restraints of the press predicated
upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result"); id. at 729-
30 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("it is the constitutional duty of the Executive... to
protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields
of international relations and national defense"); id. at 731 (White, J., concur-
ring) ("I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit
an injunction against publishing information about government plans or
operations.").
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question is: how much limitation? For the most part, the Court
studiously has avoided proffering any firm answer. When and if
the Court is forced to do so, finding that answer will be by no
means easy.
Intertwined with the ultimate question of limitation on free-
dom of speech during times of war are two independent but inter-
related questions that always arise during wartime: (1) to what
extent can our military commanders, by censorship or otherwise,
prevent the press from publishing information in its possession
that the military officials deem threatening to our national secur-
ity; and (2) to what extent can military commanders control access
by the press to information on or observation of military maneu-
vers? On both these questions there is much debate and more
than a little history. There is, however, surprisingly little law.
This Article will address each of these questions in turn, with spe-
cific reference to the recent events in the Persian Gulf, events
which illustrate the inherent conflicts between expediency and
doctrine posed by these questions.
II. MILITARY CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS
One must begin consideration of military censorship of the
press with the recognition that, in general, there is no more seri-
ous threat to freedom of speech than government censorship. 14
Justice Douglas, in his opinion, did point out that Congress, when drafting
the Espionage Act of 1950, specifically rejected a version of the bill which gave
the President the authority to "declare the existence of [a national emergency]
and, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the at-
tempting to publish or communicate any information relating to the national
defense which, in his judgment, is of such character that it is or might be useful
to the enemy." Id. at 721-22 (quoting 55 CONG. REC. 1763 (1917)). Thus, d-
spite the lack of consensus suggested by the multiple opinions in New York Times,
and the growing body of case law favorable to the military, there is continuing
Congressional support for freedom of the press in the area of national security,
even though the material published might bring harm to this country. By refus-
ing to give the President an explicit emergency power of prior restraint, Con-
gress arguably exercised a preference for subsequent punishment over prior
restraints, and thus left the press free to follow its own sensibilities and instincts
in the first instance in determining what might harm national security. Senator
Ashurst put it succinctly when he said that "freedom of the press means freedom
from the restraints of a censor, means the absolute liberty and right to publish
whatever you wish; but you take your chances of punishment in the courts of
your country for the violation of the laws of libel, slander, and treason." 55
CONG. REC. 2005 (1917) (cited in New York Times, 403 U.S. at 734 n.4). This
congressional attitude toward conflicts between the interests of a free press and
the interests of national security should continue to influence future judicial de-
cisions in this area, as it did in New York Times.
14. The Supreme Court has stated that all statutes which entail censorship
"come[] to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against [their] constitutional
1518 [Vol. 36: p. 1513
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The first amendment arose in part from the Framers' resentment
of the efforts of colonial governments to suppress and punish
speech critical of the policies of the Crown before the American
Revolution."5 As commentators from Thomas Jefferson16 to
Thomas Emerson17 have observed, one of the central tenets of
the first amendment is that it operates to immunize from govern-
mental interference speech that criticizes the policies and conduct
of government. This serves to facilitate the "robust and wide-
open debate"' 8 on public issues that is essential to democratic
governance.
validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (holding that
state resolution vesting commission with power to "encourage morality in
youth" by imposing system of "informal censorship" was unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech).
15. Maryland, for example, had an especially harsh law against open polit-
ical debate-"Punish[ing] all Speeches, Practices and Attempts relating to his
Lordship and Government, that shall be thought mutinous and Seditious."
NARRATIVES OF THE INSURRECTIONS, 1675-1690, at 309 (C. Andrews ed. 1915).
This law, held by commentators to be "against all Sense, Equity, Reason, and
Law," permitted punishments which included "Whipping, Branding, Boreing
[sic] through the Tongue, Fine, Imprisonment, Banishment, or Death." Id. For
a fuller detailing of the methods of and reasons for application of the laws of
Seditious Libel, see L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 16-61 (1985).
16. "The basis of our governments [sic] being the opinion of the people,
the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers with-
out a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Col. Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1757), in 2 THE
WRrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 359-60 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
17. Professor Emerson wrote:
It is through the political process that most of the immediate decisions
on the survival, welfare and progress of a society are made. It is here
that the state has a special incentive to repress opposition and often
wields a more effective power of suppression. Freedom of expression
in the political realm is usually a necessary condition for securing free-
dom elsewhere.... In general, the greater the degree of political dis-
cussion allowed, the more responsive is the government, the closer is it
brought to the will of its people, and the harder must it strive to be
worthy of their support.
The crucial point, however, is not that freedom of expression is
politically useful, but that it is indispensable to the operation of a dem-
ocratic form of government.
Emerson, General Theory, supra note 12, at 893.
For other writings evaluating and analyzing the theoretical underpinnings
of the First Amendment, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION
(1970); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); BeVier,
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of
Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Scanlon,
A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972).
18. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
1991) 1519
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Allowing censorship threatens that tenet because it allows
the government, on the pretext of protecting the public interest,
to "sanitize" the public forum of information or ideas that would
call into question national policies. The government thus
manipulates public opinion and ultimately controls the outcome
of public debate. A government which has that power is one
which is largely immune from public accountability.' 9 One of the
"easy" verities about the Bill of Rights, therefore, is that the first
amendment prevents the government from using censorship or
other "prior restraints" to control the flow of information to the
people.20 How true, however, is this in reality?
19. Taken to its logical extreme, governmental prior restraint puts the gov-
ernment's actions "beyond public scrutiny [by] provid[ing] its own blanket of
concealment. The government needs to offer no public justification for impos-
ing secrecy; the justification itself is secret." Knoll, National Security: The Ultimate
Threat to the First Amendment, 66 MINN. L. RE. 161, 168 (1981). Other commen-
tators agree. Emerson, for example, has stated that the public, as sovereign,
must have all information available in order to instruct its servants, the govern-
ment. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 4.
Emerson proposes that there can be no holding back of information; otherwise,
ultimate decision-making by the people, to whom the function is committed, be-
comes impossible. Id. For further discussion of the vital role of information in a
democracy, see Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521; Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE LJ. 438
(1983); Emerson, General Theory, supra note 12, at 882-83.
Not all commentators share this view. BeVier disagrees because it envisions
a "town meeting" type of direct democracy, a system neither set up by the Con-
stitution nor the way in which modern governmental institutions function. BeV-
ier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 482, 505-06 (1980). Rather, according to BeVier, the Constitu-
tion gives us a representative democracy, and it is our representatives, not the
people, who must have access to the information. Id. BeVier's view, however,
overlooks the public need for the same information in order to make informed
judgments about the election of political representatives, as well as the capacity
of informed citizens to influence congressional decisions through a variety of
channels such as directly writing to members of Congress, contributing to their
campaigns or the campaigns of their opponents, participating in public opinion
polls that so often guide our leaders, or participating in public demonstrations.
20. The Court embraced the principle of freedom to publish without prior
restraints in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Near Court held that a
statute which allowed ajudge to enjoin publication of a newspaper unless a pub-
lisher who allegedly distributed scandalous material could prove that the matter
published was true and published with good motives was censorship. Id. at 713.
The Court specifically noted that "the chief purpose of the guaranty [of liberty
of the press was] to prevent previous restraints on publications." Id. Since then,
the Supreme Court has extended this protection to other means of expression.
See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (pamphlets); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picket signs);Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
(magazines); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)
(newspapers); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial advertisements).
1520 [Vol. 36: p. 1513
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During the Cold War, it was popular in high school civics les-
sons to reinforce the idea that our Constitution protects freedom
of speech and the press by contrasting our free press with the
"propaganda machines" of our totalitarian enemies, particularly
those within the so-called Soviet Bloc. Primary and secondary
school teachers charged with the important task of inculcating ba-
sic American values taught that we, because our press was free,
were guaranteed that what we read in the newspapers or heard on
television about public events was reasonably accurate. In con-
trast, we were told, citizens in totalitarian nations were told only
what the government wanted them to hear, and that information
was often deliberate falsehood. 2'
If one wanted to fashion such a civics lesson today, the con-
flict in Iraq would appear to supply a classic "textbook" example
of this contrast between our freedoms and totalitarian practice.
Because of the independence of our press and the freedom of
speech we all enjoy, we believe that we in America were told the
truth about the fortunes of Operation Desert Storm. 22 We be-
lieve that when our press reported stunning victories for the Coa-
lition with unbelievably light casualties, this was real fact, not
some propagandist ploy. 23 In utter contrast, the people of Iraq,
21. This Cold War civics lesson is still very much at large. See, e.g., A.
KOWNSLAR & T. SMART, CIVICS, CITIZENS AND SociETY 313-14 (2d ed. 1983); S.
SCHWARTZ &J. O'CONNOR, EXPLORING OUR NATION'S HISTORY 565-66 (1974); see
also Brown, Untruth, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1991, at 16 (commenting that
even today Soviet evening news broadcast is "simply an organ of the state
apparatus").
22. For a look at the use of the media by both sides during the Gulf War,
see Alter, The Propaganda of War, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1991, at 38 (suggesting
that politicians and military officers utilized media to engender domestic support
for Gulf War); Morrow, The Fog of War, TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 16 (illustrating
difficulties inherent in distinguishing fact from propaganda during Gulf War).
23. Published reports on the lopsidedness of the damage sustained by both
sides are truly remarkable. The Iraqis had an estimated 100,000 troops killed,
captured or deserted, compared to the Coalition's 184 killed, 238 wounded, 81
missing, and 13 POW's; Iraq's hardware loss (destroyed or damaged) totalled
4,000 tanks, 2,140 artillery pieces, 1,856 armored personnel carriers ("APC"), 7
helicopters, 103 aircraft (with an additional 139 being held in Iran), and 83
ships. The Coalition's hardware loss only amounted to 4 tanks, 1 artillery piece,
9 APCs, 17 helicopters (an additional 11 were lost to non-combat accidents), 44
aircraft (an additional 10 were lost to non-combat accidents), and 2 ships. Duffy,
The One Hundred Hour War, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Mar. 11, 1991 at 11.
During the fighting, press briefings and news reports were full of positive
accounts of our swift and precise success. Night after night we were shown
videotape of our "smart" bombs going down chimney stacks to blow up the
exact target chosen. What we Were not told about, however, is that "smart"
bombs made up only 7% of all the U.S. explosives dropped on Iran and Iraq and
that 70% of the 88,500 tons of bombs dropped missed their targets. See Wicker,
An Unknown Casualiy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1991, at A29, col. 5.
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we believe, were (at least during the course of the conflict) delib-
erately misled by the calculated falsehoods of a government-con-
trolled media. Even as Iraqi forces were being subjected to a
crushing military rout unprecedented in modem warfare, 24 their
government-controlled press and media were publishing false ac-
counts of great Iraqi victories and stunning Coalition losses.
What better evidence could one imagine for the proposition that
the road of censorship leads inevitably to lies and deception?
What better proof that prior restraints are the antithesis of demo-
cratic freedom?
But not so fast. Our press was also subjected to military cen-
sorship.2 5 Television reports came back from the Persian Gulf
Even though the networks generally had the capability for live coverage of
the fighting, the closest the American public ever got to experiencing this war
first-hand without military intervention was to see reporters on rooftops while
SCUD and Patriot missiles flew in the background. All other reports came back
only after having been processed by the Joint Information Bureau of the Military
(JIB).
One of the more surprising facts about this war, even with its heavy censor-
ship, is the public's belief that they were getting enough information about the
war. A Time/CNN poll conducted in January revealed that 79% of the adults
surveyed were satisfied with the news they were receiving, and 88% supported
some censorship of the media. Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front, TIME, Feb.
4, 1991, at 45. In short, we took this war on faith: on our faith in the govern-
ment to do the right thing; on our faith in the press to serve as our watchdog
over the government; and on our underlying faith in the essential accuracy of
the information we received from both press and government sources. For spe-
cific examples of the military censorship in the Gulf war, see infra notes 25-27
and accompanying text.
24. British Commander General Peter de ]a Billiere was quoted in a News-
week article as saying "We are, today, at the end of perhaps one of the greatest
victories we have ever experienced." Barry, A Textbook Victory, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
11, 1991, at 38. That article went on to say that "[t]he rout of Iraq has few
historical precedents," comparing it to other historical routs such as Agincourt,
Plassey, and Omdurman. Id.
25. For the full content of the military guidelines regarding reporters'
movements and censorship, see Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of De-
fense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1575-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The appendices included
with the opinion contain the ground rules and regulations issued after the initia-
tion of hostilities, as well as all subsequent changes issued. Id. Appendices A to
C contain various Guidelines for News Media; appendix D contains the Centcom Pool
Membership and Operating Procedures; and appendix E contains the Operation Desert
Shield Ground Rules. Id.
In theory, reports were to be censored only for information which could
harm troop security. Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said: "It would not be
legitimate for us to object to something because it's embarrassing to us or is
critical of us." Sheridan, Press, Politicians Weigh Coverage Restrictions, BROADcAST-
ING, Feb. 25, 1991, at 52. The reality was apparently quite different. Some ex-
amples of what, in Mr. Williams' terms, would have seemed to be "illegitimate"
censorship include deletion of an Associated Press reporter's reference to Navy
pilots watching pornographic films before a mission, editing tapes of bombing
runs by removing the audio portions that revealed the "raw sounds of 'guys in
1522 [Vol. 36: p. 1513
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with subtitles saying "cleared by American military officials" or
words to that effect. If the accounts of some news reporters are to
be credited, while pictures and reports detailing Coalition power
and success were cleared for release, efforts to show aspects of
Coalition vulnerability were thwarted by military intervention.2 6
combat,'" and prohibition by the military of making public a video of Apache
helicopter attacks on Iraqi positions. DeParle, Keeping the News in Step: Are the
Pentagon Gulf War Rules Here to Stay?, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1991, at A9, col. 1
(quoting Defense Secretary Cheney, who stated that he did not regard TV tapes
as a press release); The Bombs Never Missed, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1991, at A9, col.
3. In this last instance, several unescorted reporters arriving at a forward unit
got an unauthorized viewing of a tape which, according to John Balzar, showed
Iraqi soldiers "as big as football players on the TV screen." Balzar described
the video scene: "A guy was hit and you could see him drop and he struggled
up. They fired again and the body next to him exploded." The Bombs Never
Missed, supra, at A9, col. 3. After Balzar reported on viewing this tape, he was
barred from visiting any other Apache units, and requests by other reporters to
see this tape were denied. Id.
Other examples of "illegitimate" censorship that took place include the ex-
plicit banning of the coverage of flag-draped coffins at Dover Air Force Base and
changing the description of the pilots returning from a bombing mission. Alter,
Showdown at "Fact Gap", NEWSWEEK, Feb. 4, 1991, at 61. Where a reporter de-
scribed the pilots as "giddy," the censors wanted to change the word to
"proud." Id. They compromised with "pumped up." Id.
26. As far as the viewing public is concerned, this was a relatively bloodless
war. With the exception of what CNN was allowed to broadcast from inside Iraq
(and even then broadcasts were under the censorship of the Iraqi government),
the American public received little or no information on the true extent of the
damage wrought by the war, nor any reliable information on the numbers of
civilian or military casualties. See Wicker, supra note 23 (even five months after
the end of hostilities, the number of dead Iraqi soldiers and civilians is still in
dispute).
"The history of this war is probably going to be lost," said CBS News corre-
spondent Richard Threlkeld at a panel at Fordham University. Brown, Censorship
Leaves Incomplete Picture of War, BROADCASTING, Apr. 8, 1991, at 71. Between de-
lays ranging from one day to one week, and "security review," the press lost
control over their pieces, and "no accounts of the relatively few combat engage-
ments of the war.., reached here until the military either wanted them to, or
the system got around to moving them." Getler, View From the Newsroom, Wash-
ington Post, Mar. 17, 1991, at D1, col. 1, D4, col. 2. The few accounts of death
that did reach home were delayed, fuzzy, fast notes about the deaths resulting
from friendly fire. Id.
Even the military admitted that battle footage was scarce. Captain Mike
Sherman of the Navy, who ran the JIB in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia until December,
commented: "I didn't see the images I thought I was going to see. I haven't
seen a tank battle yet, have you? Why there weren't any video teams there is
beyond me." The Bombs Never Missed, supra note 25, at A9, col. 3.
One probable explanation for this scarcity of footage is the military's
method of censoring the reporters through "access and delay." For example,
six days into the air war, Judd Rose, a correspondent for ABC News, was part of
a pool pressing for interviews with pilots. DeParle, supra note 25, at A9, col. 1.
Instead, the press pool was taken to the motor pool because their commander
complained that these "unsung heros" were not getting the recognition they
deserved. Id.
Tony Clifton, a veteran reporter for Newsweek, said: "I have never had
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There was censorship of our news media, and there was, in the
course of that censorship, apparently some effort to control the
course of American opinion about the war.27 How, we must ask,
can such practices be squared with our civics-book understanding
of the first amendment command against government
censorship?
Upon reflection, it is quickly apparent that there are strong
reasons to support military censorship of the press during war-
time, even in a democratic society committed to the protection of
free speech. In favor of press censorship is the danger that the
press might, inadvertently or deliberately, disclose information
critical to the success of military operations, thus directly risking
movement so controlled, reporting so restricted." Clifton, Frustrations for a Vet-
eran Correspondent, NEWSWEEx, Feb. 11, 1991, at 4. "[U]nless you break their
petty regulations you see nothing." Id. Nor would the viewing public see any-
thing not approved, because all TV news crews were required to use the same
footage shot during briefings or during orchestrated "Photo op" expeditions to
the front. PR Services, April 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, PRSVS file). The mili-
tary escorts even went so far as to hand out lists of"suggested" questions to ask
soldiers returning from battle. Clifton, Trying to Get the Story is a Story of its Own,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 1991, at 36.
The most extreme case of censorship came when the ground assault began
and Defense Secretary Cheney immediately announced a 48 hour news blackout.
The Bombs Never Missed, supra note 25, at A9, col. 3. After 12 hours, however, the
blackout was relaxed so that General Norman Schwarzkopf could pronounce a
"dramatic success" for the initial assault. Id. Apparently, good news supersedes
a blackout. One is left to wonder whether bad news would have had the same
effect. The typical handling of news stories, however, was merely delay, some-
times as much as 72 hours. Getler, supra, at D4, col. 2.
Other less formal forms of prior restraint were also practiced by the mili-
tary. A French TV crew, according to producer Alain Dobos, was forced at gun-
point by Marines to give up a videotape of a wounded U.S. soldier near Khafji.
Zoglin,Jumping Out of the Pool, TiME, Feb. 18, 1991, at 39. After pool reporter
DouglasJehl of the L.A. Times reported that 50 U.S. military jeeps were miss-
ing, officials complained that his story, cleared by the censors, was not "in the
best interests" of the military. Id. Jehl was subsequently ordered to leave his
pool. Id.
27. Retired Army Colonel Darryl Henderson, in a New York Times article,
said that "the military started years ago to study and train personnel in the tech-
niques of 'marketing the military viewpoint'" to overcome the "Vietnam Syn-
drome" of no public support for the war. Wicker, Marketing the War, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1991, at A23, col. 5. This marketing is done "primarily by seeing to it
that only upbeat reports went out to the public." Id.
By being able to control the press and what they saw, the military was able
to force the media to rely on press briefings for information. The military
thereby could exercise extreme control over what was known, and how it was
presented. The choice of spokespeople was carefully made and the spokespe-
ople were well-rehearsed before each session. Moreover, by providing a deluge
of dry statistics, the Pentagon could appear to be giving out more information
than actually was given. DeParle, supra note 25, at A9, col. 1; Getler, supra, note
26, at DI, col. 1.
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American lives. 28 This, in turn, could threaten the success of the
war effort, and perhaps even the vitality of the constitutional de-
mocracy on which the privileges of the first amendment depend.
Again, Operation Desert Storm supplies a classic example.
American strategy called, we now know, for a surprise ground at-
tack from a surprise direction.29 As far as we can tell today, this
strategy was singularly responsible for the Coalition's ability to
retake Kuwait without suffering heavy casualties. If the press had
learned of this plan and "scooped" it by premature reports, the
element of surprise that was so critical to our military success
could have been lost.3 0 Thousands of American and other Coali-
tion soldiers might have been killed, for no greater good than
some increased circulation or a few ratings points.31 Had any of
us been clothed with judicial robes and asked to approve censor-
ship of a report that would have revealed this American strategy,
we surely would have voted instinctively in favor of a prior re-
straint, no matter what the command of the first amendment. 32
28. The Gulf War was the first war in which the media had the capability to
broadcast live-via satellite. Thus, the risk became even more pronounced that
the Iraqis, who were known to be watching American broadcasts as well as cen-
soring their out-going reports from Iraq, could take advantage of any inadver-
tent disclosure of information which could have compromised the Coalition's
campaign.
29. For further discussion of U.S. military strategy, see supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
30. The success of this attack dramatically disproved the conventional wis-
dom that, with the sophistication of modem warfare, a surprise ground attack
had become virtually impossible-making tactical use of the element of surprise
pass6. Indeed, the Pentagon even manipulated an unwitting media to add to the
element of surprise. By keeping the media corralled and providing them with
selected information, the military was able to create the impression that the Coa-
lition intended to make an amphibious assault. Zoglin, It Was a Public Relations
Rout Too, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 56.
31. News of the war was big business and it sparked intense media competi-
tion for war news audiences. In fact, because of its inside reports and continu-
ous coverage, CNN's ratings outstripped all of the competition, showing an 11.7
rating/16.9 share during prime time for the period from January 15 to January
21, 1991. Brown, War Boosts CNN Ratings, BROADCASTING, Jan. 28, 1991, at 23,
24. Its closest network competitor, ABC, had an 11.5/16.7 rating. Id. Prior to
the war, CNN's ratings were considered high if they reached a 1.2. Id.
32. Most Americans supported the Pentagon's policy of strictly limiting me-
dia reporting. They were also generally critical of the media. Some anecdotal
evidence of the public attitude toward the media's handling of the war is sup-
plied by a sketch performed on the irreverent television show Saturday Night Live
(SNL). In a spoof on military briefings, SNL portrayed the reporters as overly-
nosy and insensitive fact-hounds, asking questions like: "What is the one piece
of information that would be most dangerous for the Iraqis to know?" Zoglin,
Just Whose Side Are They On?, TIME, Feb. 25, 1991, at 52.
Walter Cronkite, one of the century's leading broadcast journalists, faulted
the media itself for the public's attitude. He said that the press had submitted to
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Perhaps many will take comfort in the thought that our Supreme
Court probably would as well.
In Near v. Minnesota,33 the very case that established the
strong first amendment doctrine against prior restraints, the
Supreme Court commented that "[no one would question but
that a government might prevent ... the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location of troops."3 4
Although this comment was pure dictum,35 Near's hypothesis re-
garding the constitutionality of wartime prior restraints is as
firmly rooted in constitutional law as any holding of the Court.
For nearly sixty years, the Court has assumed, in reliance on Near,
that some degree of censorship to protect military strategy and
effectiveness in time of war is both inevitable and permitted by
the first amendment.3 6
Yet, even if one acknowledges the Near dictum as fundamen-
tal law, one must address the inherent limits of its hypothesis.
Near imagined the constitutionality of a restraint on publication
that actually, immediately, and specifically endangered lives and
that directly frustrated military tactics. 37 It is a large leap from
the restrictions too readily, and had "failed to make clear the public's stake in
the matter ... [-that] it is our war. Our elected representatives in Congress
gave our elected president permission to wage [war]. We had better darned well
know what they are doing in our name." Cronkite, What Is There To Hide, NEWS-
WEEK, Feb. 25, 1991, at 43.
33. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
34. Id. at 716 (footnote omitted). The Court reasoned: "When a nation is
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no
Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Id. (quoting
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
35. The Near case did not deal with wartime publication of military secrets.
A Minnesota newspaper challenged the constitutional validity of a state statute
which permitted a restraint upon the publication of"a malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper." Id. at 705. The Court held the statute unconstitu-
tional, as applied to publications charging neglect of duty and corruption upon
the part of law-enforcing officers of the State, and allowed the defendant to
prove the truth of his accusations as a defense. Id. at 722-23.
36. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981) (where State Depart-
ment regulation allowed revocation of a former CIA agent's passport because he
was engaged in a campaign to expose the CIA, Court held there was no first
amendment protection because speech having the "declared purpose of ob-
structing intelligence operations" is not protected); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan,J., concurring) (true, prova-
ble danger to national or troop security would warrant a prior restraint); Gibson
v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 567 (1963) (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("Congress could punish the breach of a carefully drawn security
law").
37. More recently, Justice Brennan reiterated the need for a "clear and
present danger" to exist before any restraint could be deemed constitutional:
1526 [Vol. 36: p. 1513
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this very focused type of restraint to the wholesale, systematic
censorship of news that the military routinely conducted during
the war with Iraq. Near certainly does not justify all, nor arguably
does it even justify very much, of what military officials actually
did by way of censorship during Operation Desert Storm.38
More importantly, an overbroad reading of Near endangers
critical first amendment values. There is an ever-present risk dur-
ing wartime that the government may try to assert authority to
restrain information beyond the limits of genuine military need.
One must not forget the terrible nightmare of Korematsu v. United
States,3 9 in which the Supreme Court permitted (wrongly, we now
agree), massive deprivations of civil liberties of Japanese-Ameri-
can citizens during World War II in the name of national security.
Korematsu did not directly implicate the first amendment,40 but it
illustrates the hydraulic tendencies of military leaders to regard
civil liberty as a threat to national security during wartime.4' It
also graphically demonstrates the dangers that inhere in judicial
deference to the military's own judgment that national security is
actually imperilled. 42 These same dangers arise when the military
Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must in-
evitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kin-
dred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support
even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may
mere conclusions be sufficient .... Unless and until the government
has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no
injunction may issue.
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. For a discussion of the extent of military censorship during Operation
Desert Storm, see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
39. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
40. Korematsu was convicted of.violating a military order that required him
to evacuate his home and relocate to a detention camp for Japanese-Americans.
Id at 215-16. Korematsu challenged his conviction, arguing that the order was
racially and ethnically biased, and therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 218. The
Court upheld the conviction. Id. at 219. Over 40 years later, that conviction was
extinguished. For a description of the case that overturned the conviction,
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (1984), see infra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
41. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians,
which reviewed the facts and circumstances surrounding the relocation of the
Japanese-Americans during World War II, found "there was substantial credible
evidence from a number of federal, military and civilian agencies contradicting
the report of General DeWitt that military necessity justified exclusion and in-
ternment of all persons ofJapanese ancestry without regard to individual identi-
fication of those who may have been 'potentially disloyal." Korematsu, 584 F.
Supp. at 1416.
42. The Commission also revealed that the DeWitt report, which was the
basis for the Executive Order implementing this evacuation, contained "wilful
historical inaccuracies and intentional falsehoods" and that the government
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takes to itself the role of deciding what news is "fit to print" about
its own handling of military affairs.43
Consider for a moment the mind-set of the military censor.
He or she is necessarily part of the command and privy to the
most sensitive secrets of the war. The censor is fully committed
to the military strategy that has been adopted and is eager for its
success. He or she is equally committed to the view that utmost
secrecy is essential to achieving victory-otherwise, the censor's
job would seem a pointless waste of time, and none of us likes to
think of our life's work as pointless. Moreover, the censor knows
that approval from superiors, and with that approval benefits like
promotion, will be seriously jeopardized if even one secret gets
out. That approval probably will not be greatly at risk, however,
if the censor sometimes unnecessarily denies clearance to print.
In addition, the censor knows that, however angry the press might
be about any one particular judgment, the fast-moving pace of
wartime events, together with the need for the press to cultivate
friendly relations with its censors, most likely precludes any vigor-
ous attempt by the press at forcing reconsideration of the cen-
sor's decisions. Therefore, the military censor, to avoid what
would appear to be the greater harm-the slightest risk of incur-
ring the displeasure of the military command, will almost surely
give "breathing space" to the military, not the press. In other
words, a system of military censorship is almost guaranteed to be
substantially overbroad in the prior restraints it enforces.44 Such
zeal by the censor, however, does run a risk of backfiring. A press
knowingly withheld information from the court when it was deciding the ques-
tion of military necessity in that case. Id. at 1417-18.
43. The reference in the text is, of course, to the famous motto of the New
York Times, "All the news that's fit to print."
44. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of overbroad restraint by
censorship, although not with military censors. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965). In Freedman, the challenger was convicted for exhibiting a movie
without first submitting it to the state censorship board for licensing. Id at 52.
He argued that the censorship scheme was an invalid prior restraint. Id. at 54.
The Court held that "[tihe administration of a censorship system ... presents
peculiar dangers to constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 57. The Court
further stated that the danger of overbroad application was especially prevalent
because "the Maryland statute lacks sufficient safeguards for confining the cen-
sor's action to judicially determined constitutional limits ...." Id.
Similar concerns are implicated in the context of military censorship be-
cause of the administrative nature of the military's commanding offices. For a-
general discussion of these concerns, see Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 656-59 (1955) (due to nature and process of
executive branch, censorship through prior restraint is too readily accom-
plished, and with too little opposition or judicial review);Jeffries, Rethinking Prior
Restraint, 92 YALE LJ. 409, 421-22 (1983) (citing Emerson, Jeffries reiterates
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that believes it is being too restrained might decide to bypass the
censorship system and visit the consequences. 45
The only Supreme Court decision actually involving a gov-
ernment attempt to enforce a wartime prior restraint, New York
Times Co. v. United States,46 significantly reinforces the notion that a
military left to its own resources will engage in vastly overbroad
censorship. There, the government unsuccessfully sought injunc-
tions against publication of the so-called "Pentagon Papers." '47 It
turned out that these materials, far from involving immediate
strategy and troop deployment, often concerned events that had
happened years and even decades before.48 Faced with the pros-
pect of such a blunderbuss restraint, the Court concluded that the
government simply had failed to meet its "heavy burden" of
showing that disclosure threatened the immediate security of
American forces then fighting in Vietnam. 49
In New York Times, the conclusion seemed inescapable that
the government was trying to avoid, not the disclosure of strategi-
cally sensitive information, but the negative public reaction that
would follow if the people learned about the mistakes American
policymakers and strategists had made in Vietnam. The govern-
ment, in other words, was trying to use the pretext of national
security to accomplish censorship's age-old, forbidden purpose-
the control of public opinion.
New York Times is the only case decided by the Supreme Court
directly addressing the government's power to invoke prior re-
straints in the name of national security. As landmark Supreme
Court cases go, however, this one decided remarkably little.
While six members of the Court agreed on the outcome, they
idea that prior restraint can be abused with ease when left unchecked in hands of
administrative process).
45. For example, many journalists covering the war struck out on their own,
defying the military's pooling system because they felt that they were not being
told the whole story. Zoglin, Jumping Out of the Pool, supra note 26, at 39. Of
course, this conduct could also be attributed, at least in part, to a need for
"scoops" to ensure high ratings. See id. Most notable of these reporters who
went off on their own was Bob Simon of CBS, who was captured by the Iraqis.
What this demonstrates, however, is that the tight control established by the
military actually brought about that which it was supposed to prevent. BROAD-
CASTING, Mar. 4, 1991, at 90.
46. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
47. Id. at 714.
48. Id. at 722 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring) (all material listed in govern-
ment's in camera brief concerned history, not future events-"[n]one of it is more
recent than 1968").
49. Id. at 714.
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agreed very little on the reasons. Justices Black and Douglas ar-
gued for nearly absolute protection for the press against govern-
ment censorship, a view that would cast the legitimacy of the Near
dictum itself into doubt.50 Justice Brennan preferred to employ
an exacting version of the clear and present danger test that
would turn on a strong showing of immediate danger to Ameri-
can strategic interests." Justices White and Stewart adhered to a
very narrow conclusion that the government had failed to make a
sufficient showing of harm from publication. 52 They, along with
Justice Marshall, stressed the absence of congressional authoriza-
tion for injunctive relief.5 3 While none of these views com-
manded sufficient support to muster even a plurality of the Court,
the case did at least lend some force to the notion that govern-
mental power to censor during wartime is subject to fairly strict
50. Justice Black in his concurrence stated: "Both the history and language
of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to
publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior re-
straints." Id. at 717 (Black,J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Douglas concluded
that the first amendment command that "'Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' ... leaves, in my view, no room
for governmental restraint on the press." Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. I).
For a discussion on the dictum of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931),
see supra notes 13 & 20 and accompanying text.
51. Justice Brennn stated:
Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must in-
evitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can sup-
port even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may
mere conclusions be sufficient .... Unless and until the Government
has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no
injunction may issue.
New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52. "We hold that the United States has not met its burden.... To sustain
the Government in these cases would be to start the courts down a long and
hazardous road that I am not willing to travel, at least without congressional
guidance and direction." Id at 732-33 (WhiteJ, with whom Stewart,J.,joined,
concurring).
53. According to Justice Marshall, "[ilt would . . . be utterly inconsistent
with the concept of separation of powers for this Court to use its power of con-
tempt to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit."
Id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice White agreed.
It is thus clear that Congress has addressed itself to the problems of
protecting the security of the country and the national defense from the
unauthorized disclosure of potentially damaging information [via 18
U.S.C. §§ 793, 798 (1948)]. However, Congress has not authorized the
injunctive remedy against threatened publication. It has apparently
been satisfied to rely on criminal sanctions and their deterrent effect on
the responsible as well as the irresponsible press.
Id. at 740 (White, J., concurring).
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limits and that any permissible censorship must be supported by
specific national security needs.
If the force and significance of New York Times was doubtful
the day it was decided, it is even more doubtful today. Of the
justices voting with the majority, only one, Justice White, remains
on the Court; four have been replaced by justices with decidedly
more pro-governmental leanings than their predecessors. 54
Given the Rehnquist Court's willingness to reconsider other pre-
cedent in the first amendment arena,55 it is very possible that a
new test case on military censorship would produce a significant
departure from even these basic teachings of New York Times.
Not everyone, however, sees the lack of consensus between
the justices in New York Times as necessarily detrimental. Shortly
after the case was decided, Professor Kalven astutely observed
that the uncertainty of the case may actually be one of its greatest
virtues. 56 In Professor Kalven's view, the Court, faced with a vir-
tual minefield of constitutional perplexities, wisely refused to go
more than a few tentative steps. 57 While the Court disallowed the
patently overbroad censorship attempt at issue, it left open the
possibility that, in other circumstances involving national security,
the necessary showing for a prior restraint might be established
and other routes of control over the press, such as post-publica-
tion criminal prosecution, might remain open.58 What the New
54. While this Article was being prepared, Justice Marshall retired and his
successor, Justice Clarence Thomas, was confirmed. Justice Thomas has not, to
the author's knowledge, stated a clear position on the issues in this Article.
55. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist said in an article in the New York
Times that, while adherence to precedence was preferred, it was "not an inexo-
rable command." Greenhouse, High Court Widens Evidence Allowed in Capital Cases,
N.Y. Times,June 28, 1991, at A1, col..4, A15, col. 1. The decisions of the Court
have already evidenced this predilection to reconsider precedent. See, e.g., Os-
borne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (upholding Ohio statute proscribing pos-
session and viewing of child pornography, thus limiting Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1968)); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990) (concluding that free exercise clause permits state to prohibit
sacramental use of peyote and deny unemployment benefits to one who is dis-
charged from employment for such use, limiting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
393 (1963)). Perhaps the most controversial instance of "new" Court thinking is
the current shift in the abortion arena. Compare Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (plurality opinion) (right to abortion consid-
ered "liberty interest") with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1972) (right to
abortion part of fundamental right to privacy).
56. Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at
War, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 33-34 (1971) (Court left open for later debate what
truths about government may be kept from public under "security concerns"
through use of government sanctions).
57. Id.
58. Id. Professor Kalven stated:
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York Times Court did, therefore, was effectively to leave federal
officials a fairly large zone of discretion to pursue their policies
regarding wartime censorship.
The practical result of the New York Times decision was that
the scope of press freedom during wartime was left largely where
it had been for over a century-to a process that may best be
characterized as "negotiation" between the press and the mili-
tary. In most American wars since the Civil War, this process had
secured voluntary submission by the press to censorship.59 At the
same time, military officials had been willing to share much,
though surely not all, pertinent information about their military
endeavors with the press corps. In a sense, one could say that the
government bargained away some of its power to control the dis-
closure of information-a power that the Court in other contexts
has regarded as relatively unaffected by first amendment con-
cerns6 0-in exchange for the press's willingness to submit to sys-
tematic censorship without mounting a first amendment
challenge. Under this implicit "deal," access became the quid pro
quo for prior restraint.6 l
This system worked relatively well in the past. It existed dur-
ing World War II, Korea and, to some extent, during Vietnam.6 2
It offered the virtue of avoiding a court challenge which would
force the Supreme Court to define with greater precision the ex-
[The New York Times decision] left the Court free, if necessary, at some
later time in a criminal prosecution to [make] a determination of the
kinds of truths about government activity to the dissemination of which
government may for security reasons apply sanctions to keep them out
of the reach of public opinion.
Id. at 33.
59. For an overview of the history of wartime censorship, see Cassell, Re-
strictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada, and
"Off-the-Record Wars," 73 GEO. LJ. 931, 932-45 (1985) (military has historically
deemed access by press to war zone inappropriate and has always engaged in
varying degrees of censorship of frontline reporting); Gottschalk, "Consistent
With Security"... A History of American Military Press Censorship, 5 COMM. & L. 35
(Summer 1983) (chronicling censorship of press during wartime, from Revolu-
tionary War to Vietnam); Lubow, Read Some About It, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Mar.
18, 1991, at 23-25 (type of censorship placed on reporters during Gulf War was
status quo; Vietnam's openness was anomaly which probably will not be seen
again).
60. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding power
of CIA to punish wrongful disclosure of classified information by former agent
who published book about his experiences).
61. For a discussion of one broadcaster's attitude towards the relationship
between access and prior restraint, see Cronkite, supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text.
62. For a discussion of the relative merits of the "access for prior restraint
bargain," see Cassell, supra note 59, at 937-45.
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tent of permissible wartime censorship. It is likely that both the
government and the media sensed that such a judicial challenge
might well work to everyone's disadvantage: the press would suf-
fer because the Court would probably, for the first time in history,
directly sustain the constitutionality of some prior restraint on
political speech; the military would suffer because the Court
would be constrained to place some limit on the discretion of mil-
itary censors in order to protect first amendment values. Thus,
both sides tacitly agreed, in this area at least, that the exact limits
of the first amendment freedom of the press were best left
undefined.63
Toward the end of the Vietnam conflict, however, the historic
cooperation between press and military began to break down.
There seems to have been a lingering sense among military offi-
cials that the graphic, and often critical, media portrayal of the
events in Vietnam harmed the war effort by weakening public
support and damaging troop morale. 64 The New York Times deci-
sion itself probably contributed to the breakdown, in part by sym-
bolizing a shift from cooperation to antagonism in military-press
relations, and in part by disturbing the equilibrium in "bargaining
power" between these two institutions. By imposing a strong
barrier to judicially supervised censorship, New York Times also
may well have contributed to a fundamental change in focus by
the Pentagon-from censorship to control of access as the chief
means of limiting press reporting on military affairs.
After Vietnam, the Pentagon announced a new policy that
would both restrict and place under direct military supervision
63. In his dissent in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971),Justice Blackmun alluded to the danger of fixing standards for the scope
of press rights during wartime:
First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this
Court.... What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly devel-
oped standards, of the broad right of the press to print and of the very
narrow right of the Government to prevent. Such standards are not yet
developed. The parties here are in disagreement as to what those stan-
dards should be. But even the newspapers concede that there are situa-
tions where restraint is in order and is constitutional. Mr. Justice
Holmes gave us a suggestion when he said in Schenck, "It is a question
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."
Id. at 761 (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)).
64. For further discussion of the media's coverage of the Vietnam conflict,
see Cassell, supra note 59, at 941-42 and accompanying text.
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media reporting on future military undertakings. 65 The imple-
mentation of this policy in subsequent deployments of American
military forces demonstrated increasing resistance to press inter-
ests. This was especially true in Grenada, when American forces
moved in to topple a communist regime, and in Panama, when
American forces were used to oust and capture Manuel
Noriega.66 In these instances, members of the press were virtu-
ally excluded until the critical phases of each operation were over.
Members of the press complained bitterly,67 but any opportunity
for legal challenge was prevented by the swift completion of each
of these military exercises. For example, in Flynt v. Weinberger,68 a
publisher challenged the Pentagon's policy on press access in
Grenada, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the challenge was moot-the invasion was over
and the press restrictions had been lifted.69
65. This policy, established by the Department of Defense, placed severe
access restrictions upon the press during the invasions of Grenada and Panama.
See Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558,
1563 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("DOD placed significant restraints on media cover-
age, particularly in terms of access for newsgathering purposes."). After the
press's complaints regarding their exclusion from Grenada, the military con-
vened a panel to study the access problem. Headed by Major General Winant
Sidle, this panel (Sidle Panel) developed a basic framework of rules to govern
future access. Note, The Press and the Invasion of Grenada: Does the First Amendment
Guarantee the Press a Right of Access to Wartime News, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 873, 878-82,
app. at 902-03 (1985) (reprinting cover letter by General Sidle to General Ves-
sey and Report by CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel). For a further discussion of
this report and its subsequent application and modifications during Operation
Desert Storm, see infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
66. Reporters were completely banned from Grenada for the first two days
of the operation. When four journalists reached the island by boat, the military
removed them and placed them on the carrier Guam. Cassell, supra note 59, at
944; Note, supra note 65, at 875-76. Two days after the invasion, troops took
reporters on a guided tour of the island but did not allow them free access until
several days after the fighting had ceased. Cassell, supra note 59, at 943-45;
Note, supra note 65, at 875-76. In Panama, no reporters had access to the opera-
tion until the second day, and even then, access was under the strict control of
the Pentagon. Olson & Daly, The First Casualty of War, RECORDER, Jan. 25, 1991,
at 4.
67. See Note, supra note 65, at 876 n.24 & app. II; Gailey, U.S. Bars Coverage
of Grenada Action, News Groups Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
For criticism of the policy vis-i-vis Grenada, see Lewis, What Was He Hiding, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1983, at A19, col. 5; Safire, UsAgainst Them, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30,
1983, at E19, col. 1.
68. 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The press was denied access to cover
the U.S. military intervention in Grenada from October 25-27, 1983. Id. at 134-
35. Thereafter, "a limited number of press representatives, including one of the
appellant's reporters, [were] transported by military aircraft to Grenada." Id. at
135. On November 7, 1983, all travel restrictions to Grenada were lifted, giving
the press unlimited access to the island. Id.
69. Id. at 135. The court concluded that the exception to the mootness
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In Operation Desert Storm, the smoldering disagreement be-
tween the press and the military came even more visibly into the
open. Members of the press publicly complained that the military
was extremely stingy with information, that much of what was dis-
closed was varnished to such a high public relations gloss that the
accuracy was suspect, and that government censorship was often
preoccupied with style and "packaging" more than substance. 70
The military, in turn, complained that the press was petulant,
meddlesome and recklessly unsympathetic to the realities of mili-
tary operations. One result of this dispute was a court challenge
to the government's system of restraints by dissatisfied members
of the media in Nation Magazine v. United States Department of De-
fense.71 This challenge, like that in Flynt, was once again dismissed
on justiciability grounds, thanks to the rapid completion of the
military enterprise.72
While the focus of the litigation in both Flynt and Nation Mag-
azine was access, if there is any merit to the notion that access and
censorship issues are interrelated, the instigation of these lawsuits
may signal that cooperation between the press and the military on
the question of prior restraints may also be nearing an end.
Given the favorable outcome for the press in New York Times, an
attack on censorship is a trump card the press will almost surely
have to play in future litigation against the government over war-
time media rights.
At least for now, the delicate balance produced by the
Supreme Court's policy of issue avoidance has been preserved by
the happenstance of an unbelievably quick and successful end to
the Persian Gulf war. The balance is getting more precarious
doctrine for those controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review" did
not apply because "there is no reasonable expectation" that the Grenada con-
troversy will recur. Id-
70. See Corliss, A Review: Performin' Norman at Center Stage, TIME, Mar. 11,
1991, at 57; Zoglin, It Was A Public Relations Rout Too, supra note 30, at 56.
71. 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
72. According to the Nation Magazine court, "past injury alone is not suffi-
cient to merit the award of relief against future conduct." Id. at 1569. Judge
Sand's opinion is a curious piece ofjudicial statesmanship. First, he rejected the
government's claim that the matter was a political question. Id. at 1566-68. Sec-
ond, while he concluded that some claims were moot, he found that others es-
caped mootness because they were "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Id. at 1570. Nevertheless, relying on Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S.
549 (1947), he concluded that the claims which survived were "too abstract" to
be appropriate for judicial decision. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1575. This
was probably the narrowest ground on which he could rule, since as Judge Sand
himself observed, in another military episode the same level of abstraction might
not recur. Id.
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however, and in a future conflict, the Court may be forced to re-
visit the issue of military censorship. The risks posed by revisita-
tion to both press and Pentagon are great. To remain consistent
with the principles on prior restraint worked out in other contexts
would require the Court to place heavy burdens of persuasion on
the military-burdens that the military might well be unwilling or
unable to meet.73 Yet, the desire not to interfere with successful
war waging might tempt the Court to relax those burdens,
thereby weakening the policy against government censorship that
lies at the core of the first amendment protection for the press. 74
73. For cases discussing the permissibility of prior restraints, see Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) ("[T]he barriers to prior restraint
remain high and the presumption against its use continues intact."); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Aus-
tin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (The government "thus carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its con-
stitutional validity."); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For a discussion
of New York Times Co. and Near, see supra notes 13, 20, 35 & 46-53 and accompa-
nying text.
74. The Court's longstanding tradition of deference to the executive and
legislative branches in military affairs lends further support to the notion that it
might relax restrictions on wartime prior restraints. For example, the Court has
allowed greater prohibitions on speech in circumstances dealing with the mili-
tary. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (speech may be prohibited on
military base); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967) (burning of draft
cards may be prohibited); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (distri-
bution of anti-war circulars to draftees may be prohibited). The Court has addi-
tionally acknowledged greater deference to congressional and executive
determinations on military affairs. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57(1988) (Congress is accorded great deference in area of authority over national
defense and military affairs); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988) (federal government may not be sued in tort for claims arising from gov-
ernment contractor's negligence); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)(wearing of yarmulke by those in military uniform may be prohibited); Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (CIA may, as condition of employment, ob-
tain employee's promise to refrain from publishing any information relating to
the agency; if employee breaches agreement, government may seek specific per-
formance of restrictive covenant as well as compensatory damages); Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (federal government may not be sued in tort
for injuries sustained incident to military service).
This potential relaxation on prior restraint restrictions could have both a
procedural and a substantive content. Procedurally, the Court might suspend
the traditional requirements of prompt pre-censorship hearings before an im-
partial tribunal, probably on the ground that these requirements would pose
unreasonable barriers to swift military action. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1964) (any restraint prior to judicial review must be limited to preserv-
ing status quo for shortest time judicially sound and must be followed by a
prompt final judicial determination); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1962) (system of prior administrative restraints must contain means for notice,
hearing and judicial review before publication may be determined to be
"objectionable").
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III. ACCESS TO MILITARY OPERATIONS
As difficult and troubling as the issue of prior restraints dur-
ing wartime may be, the question of press access to wartime af-
fairs is, if anything, even more baffling. At least with the question
of prior restraint, we know we are dealing with speech, and we
know something about the Framers' attitudes toward censorship.
"Access," however, is not clearly speech. When a reporter claims
a right of access, he or she is asking for a right to be in certain
places, to speak to certain people, to learn certain data, or to wit-
ness certain events. There are strong reasons to believe that
some of this behavior is primarily "conduct," not "speech," and
therefore outside the protection of the first amendment. 75
Indeed, one can go further in the distinction between prohi-
bition of access and prior restraint. In the wake of New York Times,
Professor Alexander Bickel, who represented the New York Times
in that case, argued that untrammeled government control over
Substantively, the Court might be tempted to reduce the degree of particu-
larity required for a showing that publication would endanger military forces,
probably on the ground that nonmilitary judges lack sufficient expertise to ap-
preciate subtle dangers of disclosure. Cf Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 565-70 (1976) (while "barriers to prior restraint remain high and the
presumption against its use continues intact," no finding that alternative meas-
ures would not have protected defendant's rights; "Nebraska Supreme Court
did no more than imply such measures might not be adequate"). As the Court
reasoned in Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 651 (1981), "the significance of the governmental interest must be
assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum
involved." By analogy, the Court might well take the view that the "characteris-
tic nature and function" of warfare necessitate a system of censorship that con-
fers substantially greater discretion on the censor. See also Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970) (discussing procedural
components of first amendment protections).
75. The Supreme Court has often relied on the distinction between con-
duct and speech to define the limits of the first amendment. Indeed, in several
cases involving freedom of the press, including one decided last term, the Court
has held that the newsgathering activities of the press are subject to regulation
because they do not directly involve speech. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (where press breached promise of confidentiality to news
source, first amendment does not bar promissory estoppel, a state-law doctrine;
nor does first amendment require that protection for the press mandate stricter
scrutiny than would be applicable to others); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)
("To the extent the revocation of [former CIA agent's] passport operates to in-
hibit [him], it is an inhibition of action, rather than of speech."); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (requiring newsmen to appear and testify on news
sources befor6 grand jury does not "abridge the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment"); Zamel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)
(Secretary of State did not deny passport selectively on basis of political belief or
affiliation, but imposed general ban on travel to Cuba following break in diplo-
matic relations; "there are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed
by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow").
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disclosure of information is a critical condition precedent to the
first amendment doctrine against prior restraint. Because the
government has the power to prevent disclosure in the first place,
we can afford the luxury of denying it the power to prohibit publi-
cation of information that has been disclosed.76 Arguably, the
Court implicitly adopted this view in the national security arena in
Snepp v. United States,77 where it upheld the power of the govern-
ment to penalize a former agent of the CIA for publicly disclosing
classified information. The Court has also explicitly relied on
government control of access as a "less restrictive alternative" to
punishment of speech in other contexts, most notably in Florida
Star v. B.J.F.78 There, the Court concluded that, while the gov-
ernment may refuse to disclose the identity of a rape victim, it
may not subject the press to liability for publishing the name of a
victim that has been inadvertently released. 79
76. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 79-80 (1975). Professor
Bickel states:
The government is entitled to keep things private and will attain as
much privacy as it can get away with politically by guarding its privacy
internally.... Yet the power to arrange security at the source, looked
at in itself, is great, and if it were nowhere countervailed it would be
quite frightening ... since the law in no wise guarantees its prudent
exercise or even effectively guards against its abuse.... If we should
let the government censor as well as withhold that would be too much
dangerous power.
id.
77. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (Court held that employment agreement requiring
pre-publication review of CIA employee's book was not prior restraint).
78. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). According to the Florida Star Court:
To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the govern-
ment may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acqui-
sition, thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail principle the
publication of any information so acquired. To the extent sensitive in-
formation is in the government's custody, it has even greater power to
forestall or mitigate the injury caused by its release. The government
may classify certain information, establish and enforce procedures en-
suring its redacted release, and extend a damages remedy against the
government or officials where the government's mishandling of sensi-
tive information leads to its dissemination. Where the information is
entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truth-
ful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemina-
tion of private facts.
/d. at 534; see also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1978)("By placing information in the public domain in official court records, the State
must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being
served.... States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful infor-
mation contained in official court records open to public inspection."); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976) (where court could control access
through power to close a courtroom but did not, "what transpires there could
not be subject to prior restraint").
79. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538. As evidenced by Florida Star, the Court has
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Yet, as the Court itself has recognized, the right of free
speech is a paltry right indeed if it does not include in some degree
an attendant right to the wherewithal of speech.80 How, for ex-
ample, could we criticize our government if that government had
the power to declare all its operations secret? We cherish free
speech because it allows a "marketplace of ideas"8 1 in which we
can, individually and democratically, decide for ourselves what is
the truth. We simply cannot do that, however, if the government
can stop us from learning the facts on which our ideas about
truth, particularly political truth, are based. For speech to be
meaningfully free, it must be accompanied by other instrumental
been quite careful in explicitly protecting disseminators of information who are
outside the government. Once governmental outsiders have obtained informa-
tion, the government cannot, without a strong showing, penalize its publication.
See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (television sta-
tion cannot be punished for broadcasting name of 17-year-old rape victim which
had been obtained from the courthouse records); Landmark Communications
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (Court reversed conviction of newspaper
which had published results of proceedings before commission responsible for
inquiries into complaints ofjudicial disability or misconduct; state had not met
standard of showing clear and present danger to administration ofjustice which
would result from publication); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 12-20, 12-21 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing ability of government to withhold cer-
tain types of information from public based upon content and source of
information).
80. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plural-
ity opinion). In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that the right of the public
and press to attend criminal trials was guaranteed by the Constitution; "[i]t is
not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials to hear, see,
and communicate observations concerning them as a 'right to access,' or a 'right
to gather information' for we have recognized that 'without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.'" Id. at 576
(quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (citations and footnote
omitted)); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)
("The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-ex-
pression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of infor-
mation from which members of the public may draw."); Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) ("In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a
First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas.' ").
81. This expression is derived from Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ulti-
mate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market"). The Court's frequent references to Justice Holmes' famous phrase
demonstrate the degree to which this concept has become embedded in first
amendment jurisprudence. For Supreme Court opinions referring to this
phrase, see Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Flynt v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988); F.C.C. v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 787 (1978); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973); Garner v. Louisiana, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963); Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
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rights, among them at least some measure of a right of access to
information about government events.
This public interest in access is particularly acute during a
foreign war. Unless the press can tell us what is happening with
reasonable accuracy and precision, we have no independent way
of knowing. If we cannot know about the events in war, we are
simply unable to exercise any form of democratic control over
those who wage it with our money and our blood.8 2 Without gov-
ernment disclosure of information relating to the rationale,
scope, cost, execution, and success or failure of operations, we
are collectively disenfranchised. Without disclosure, the press is
as effectively precluded from performing its historic "watchdog"
role as if the government had instituted a massive system of prior
restraint.8 3
Indeed, a war without some right of press access begins to
approach one of the horrors of modern government imagined by
George Orwell in 1984.84 His imaginary society was perpetually
involved in some nameless, shapeless, pointless foreign conflict
that the government manipulated as a means of social control and
as a justification for its "Big Brother" tactics.85 Like most such
82. AsJustice Black has stated: "[P]aramount among the responsibilities of
a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the
people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign
shot and shell." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring).
83. Professor BeVier has observed that denial of access can have much the
same effect on the flow of information and ideas as censorship.
[T]he denial of access undoubtedly impedes the (information gather-
ing] process and thus constricts the flow of information to the public.
The effect on the flow of information, therefore, of governmental denials
of access of information is in that respect similar to the predictable ef-
fects of punishment or censorship....
Perhaps more importantly, governmental denial of access to infor-
mation poses a different kind of direct threat to speech than do punish-
ment and censorship, and thus the forms of governmental activity
directly implicate different values. Punishment or censorship directly
undermine the value offree speech, while the denial of access to infor-
mation undermines the value of well-informed speech.
BeVier, supra note 17, at 498-99.
84. G. ORWELL, 1984 (2d ed. 1977).
85. Id. at 35-36. Orwell's protagonist worked in the Ministry of Truth,
where he "rectified" old newspaper stories so that they did not contradict cur-
rent ideology, or contain economic or social forecasts which did not square with
the present reality. Id. at 39-44. This included maintaining the illusion that the
current war, even though alliances and enemies had shifted again and again, was
the war that had always been ensuing. Id. at 34-35. Big Brother's rationale for
this deception was that "'who controls the past' . . . 'controls the future: who
controls the present controls the past.'" Id. at 35. Thus, "if all records told the
same tale-then the lie passed into history and became truth." Id. By rewriting
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visions, Orwell's apocalypse did not arrive on schedule, at least in
the Western hemisphere. One is tempted to observe, however,
that the 1980s did produce a series of military episodes-the Falk-
land Islands for the British, Grenada and Panama for the Ameri-
cans-that bear at least some superficial resemblance to the kind
of war-as-social-control that Orwell envisioned.
I believe that most of us who followed the unfolding of
events in the Persian Gulf at some level experienced concern
about access to news of the war. We were acutely aware of the
fact that our armed forces were facing what was then the fourth
largest military machine in the world. Our enemy was battle-
tested and experienced as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. We were
not. Our enemy was experienced in desert warfare. We were not.
Our enemy had many of the sophisticated tools of modern war-
fare-tanks, jet fighters, air and sea missiles. We were signifi-
cantly superior in these technological categories, but few of our
weapons had any track record in actual combat.8 6 We knew that
our enemy had biological and chemical weapons and that it had
used such weapons with brutal effectiveness in the past.8 7 At the
outset of hostilities and at each major point of escalation, we
were, I believe, frightened that this conflict could develop into a
major war with major bloodshed. However strongly we publicly
voiced our support for American and Coalition forces, many of
us, I believe, were privately concerned that this war might prove
to be a dreadful and costly mistake.88
history, therefore, Big Brother could maintain a tarnish-proof image of being an
infallible government.
86. Atkinson, Pentagon Speeds Development, Production of Arms for Gulf Use,
Washington Post, Dec. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 1 ("A major war in the Gulf would,
in effect, serve as a proving ground for a number of military concepts adopted
by the United States in the fifteen years since South Vietnam fell.... We have a
tremendous amount of new equipment and weaponry that we are using for the
first time." (quoting Retired Colonel Trevor N. Dupury, to the House Armed
Services Committee)). In addition, many new weapons also had their develop-
ment speeded up, and their pre-deployment testing shortened. Id.
87. Watson, The Point of Attack, NEwsWEEK, Feb. 11, 1991, at 24. Iraq
warned repeatedly that it would use chemical weapons as it had in the past
against both Iran and Kurdish civilians. Id. at 25. Iraq's chemical arsenal in-
cluded both mustard gas and various nerve gases deliverable by warplane, heli-
copter or missile. Id. The standard form of delivery, however, was to place the
warheads on artillery or mortar shells. Id. Iraq also had been working on bio-
logical weapons using virulent diseases such as Anthrax, but it was doubted that
Iraq had these weapons at a usable stage of development. Id.; see also 20/20:
Saddam's Deadly Mix (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 15, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, ABCNEW file) (detailed account of Iraq's capabilities and past usage of
chemical weapons and the effects of those weapons).
88. Although he in fact voted in favor of giving President Bush authority to
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Perhaps for these reasons, perhaps for others, the American
public had an insatiable appetite for news of the war. Many of us
acquired what came to be dubbed "CNN syndrome" 89-habitual
tendency to stay glued to radio and television for almost hourly
updates on the war. We awoke and had breakfast to news of the
war; we pored over newspapers that contained little else besides
war news; we constantly interrupted our workdays to find out how
things were going in the Persian Gulf; we absorbed all the footage
of wartime we could get on expanded versions of the evening
news; we fell asleep to nighttime broadcasts about the war; we
even had our children tune in to special Saturday morning edi-
tions of war news for kids.90
It is not simply that all this coverage was available. We de-
manded it, read it, listened to it, and watched it. We, in other
words, sought "access" to all the information about the war we
could get. When the press and the media demanded that military
officials give them access to more information about the war, they
were acting in and reflecting our interests.
The mere desire for information, however intense, does not
of course establish a constitutional right to receive it. On the
question of whether the first amendment affords a right of access
to military affairs there is literally no law at all. 91 Although the
idea that the first amendment might include a right of access to
governmental activities is not entirely without precedent, the
go to war, Representative Jim Cooper, Democrat from Tennessee, later admit-
ted that a fear of failure was commonplace at the time. "A few months ago, we
thought that everything would go wrong, that casualties would be enormous,
that there would be unforseen catastrophes, that Murphy's law would prevail."
Dionne, Kicking the "Vietnam Syndrome": Victory Sweeps Away U.S. Doomed-to-Failure
Feeling, Washington Post, Mar. 4, 1991, at Al, col. 1, A21, col. I [hereinafter
Vietnam Syndrome].
89. Davison, Britain Faces Threats With a Stif Upper Lip, Sunday Times
(London), Jan. 27, 1991, at 20, col. 6 ("CNN Syndrome" described new Ameri-
can condition, named after 24-hour cable network, "which had led to people
suffering stress from over-exposure to war coverage").
90. From August 5, 1990 to March 1, 1991, there were over 120 broadcasts
on one network alone (excluding the daily evening news reports) regarding the
Gulf War, including 21 special reports in the first three days of the ground war.
For information regarding the extensive coverage provided by the press, see
Kurtz, The Media Bombardment: Saturation Coverage, T. V v. Newspapers, Washington
Post, Feb. 6, 1991, at CI; Zoglin, How Dailies Cover a TV. War, TIME, Feb. 11,
1991, at 78. However, one reporter also noted that, despite saturation coverage,
the average American had very little real knowledge of what was happening.
Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front, supra note 23, at 44. This was due in part
to the nature of air war behind enemy lines, and in part to the press restrictions.
Id.
91. See Kalven, supra note 56, at 28 & n.130 (discussing absence of law con-
cerning whether first amendment affords right of access to military affairs).
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Supreme Court has never recognized such a right to information
about military operations. Moreover, the Court has been very
cautious about recognizing any rights of access under the first
amendment at all. 92 Consequently, although a case can be made
for a right of wartime access, establishing such a right is what in
military idiom might be termed an "uphill march."98
The leading case on a first amendment right of access is Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.94 In that case, a plurality of the
Court did recognize a first amendment right of access to criminal
trials. 95 The Richmond Newspapers plurality relied on a handful of
prior cases recognizing, in a variety of contexts, that freedom of
92. "[TMhe First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional
right of special access to information not available to the public generally."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972).
93. "As in so many instances perspective will depend upon the comer from
which one comes at the problem, on whether one sees it as a matter of adjusting
security considerations in order to allow information into the domain of public opin-
ion, or as I would incline, as a matter of withdrawing information from the public
domain on security grounds." Kalven, supra note 56, at 35.
94. 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15
(1978) ("First Amendment ... [does not] mandatefl a right of access to govern-
ment information or sources of information within the government's control");
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (statute which prohibited speeches and
demonstrations of partisan political nature on military installation did not vio-
late first amendment); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974)
(FBI policy prohibiting personal interview between newsmen and individually
designated inmates did not violate first amendment because "it d[id] not deny
the press access to sources of information available to members of the general
public"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824-28 (1974) (statute barring media
interviews with specific inmates did not violate first amendment where ample
alternative channels of communication existed for inmates); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (newspaper reporter must respond to grand jury sub-
poena notwithstanding agreement by reporter with news source to conceal
facts); cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-79 (1979) (press does
not have right of access to pre-trial hearing; trial judge may take protective
measures to minimize effects of pre-trial publicity even where not strictly
necessary).
95. "We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implied in the guar-
antees of the First Amendment .... Absent an overriding interest articulated in
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." Richmond News-
papers, 448 U.S. at 580-81.
The Justices did not agree, however, on where that right was to be found.
Justice Stevens, relying upon Saxbe and Houchins, expansively viewed those deci-
sions as "unequivocally hold[ing] that an arbitrary interference with access to
important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the
press protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan,joined by Justice Marshall, canvassed the Court's history of
access cases, including Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1(1965), and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), as well as
Sa.be and Houchins. 448 U.S. at 585-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). He empha-
sized that this right of access must be drawn from an historical consideration of
the tradition of "public entree to particular proceedings or information," and a
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speech sometimes entails a right to gather or receive information
or a right of access to certain places for expressive purposes.98 A
few subsequent cases, in turn, have cautiously extended the Rich-
mond Newspapers ruling.97 The Court repeatedly has warned, how-
ever, that general rights of access do not exist within the first
amendment and its ad hoc decisions on access rights of the press
should not be read beyond their own factual contexts. 98
determination of whether access to a particular government process is important
in terms of that very process. Id. at 589.
Justice Stewart stressed the ability of a court to place reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions on entry, based upon considerations of orderliness, the
physical limitations of the courtroom, and to preserve such interests as trade
secrets, or "the sensibilities of a youthful [rape] prosecution witness." Id. at 600
(Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun found the "veritable potpourri" of constitutional sources
relied upon by his brethren-"the speech clause of the First Amendment, the
Press Clause, the Assembly Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and the penumbral
guarantees recognized in past decisions"-to be "troublesome." Id at 603
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part). He would rather settle the matter affirma-
tively by sole reliance upon the sixth amendment, thereby overruling the Court's
earlier holding in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 448 U.S. at
603 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
Justice White only added that he felt that this issue should have been dealt
with in Gannett. ld. at 581 (White, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 577-78. The cases relied on by the Court include De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) ("The right of peaceable assembly is a right
cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.");
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (streets and side-
walks are traditionally open, and people may assemble for any lawful purpose in
public places both to speak and to listen); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575-76 (1941) (these rights of assembly and speech may be subject to traditional
time, place and manner restrictions).
97. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1985)
("[A] preliminary hearing may be closed only if specific findings are made dem-
onstrating that first there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to
a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent, and sec-
ond, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defend-
ant's fair trial rights"); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
511 (1983) (guarantees of openness in public trials extends to cover voir dire
proceedings); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07
(1982) (compelling interest, such as protection of minor victim of sex crime,
does not justify mandatory closure of courtroom; rather, state's interest may be
secured by a case-by-case analysis of whether that interest warrants closure). But
cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1983) (preventing access to and
publication of information revealed in discovery process does not restrict tradi-
tionally public source of information and therefore does not abridge any first
amendment right).
98. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18. According to the
Court: "[O]ur holding today does not mean that the First Amendment rights of
the public and representatives of the press are absolute .... [A] trial judge, in
the interest of the fair administration ofjustice, [may] impose reasonable [time,
place and manner] limitations on access to a trial." Id.; see also Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. at 9 ("But even when a right of access attaches, it is not
absolute."); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. at 519 ("The fact that
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Although a claim to a right of access regarding military oper-
ations thus would not be wholly revolutionary, it is by no means a
sure thing. According to Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion
in Richmond Newspapers, three factors favored a first amendment
right of access to criminal trials: (1) strong public need for infor-
mation about criminal proceedings, a need closely linked to func-
tions of democratic self-government; (2) a long tradition of
openness; and (3) the lack of specific legislative findings establish-
ing compelling governmental reasons for wholesale closure. 99 To
establish a right of access in the military arena, the press would
need to make a comparable showing. The press can, I believe,
make a colorable showing on all three fronts; but, with the excep-
tion of the public need element, the arguments are weaker and
more qualified than in Richmond Newspapers.
The reasons why there is a public need for information about
warfare have already been canvassed. 100 The need is real and, if
our collective experience during Operation Desert Storm is any
gauge, pressing. Moreover, it is clear that this information bears
directly on self-government. Our elected representatives in Con-
gress declare war.' 01 Our elected President commands it. 1°2
They are all accountable to us, the voters, for their military deci-
sions. We cannot makejudgments about their performance with-
out an independent source of information regarding the wars
they choose to conduct.' 0 3
this [was) a First Amendment case does not, of course, mean that the public's
right of access is unlimited"); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. at 608
n.20 ("[I]ndividualized determinations are always required before the right of
access may be denied .... "); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)
(protection to gather news does not extend to reporter's refusal to testify before
grand jury under facts of that case); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The
right to speak and publish does not carry with it unrestrained right to gather
information.").
99. 448 U.S. at 569-81.
100. For a discussion on the relationship between access to information,
public debate and democratic government, see supra notes 16-19 and accompa-
nying text.
101. "The Congress shall have the power.., to declare war." U.S. CoNs'r.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
102. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called into the
actual service of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
103. Because the military officials who carry out these directives and who
plan, oversee and conduct the censorship are political appointees, they are not
as readily accountable to the voting populace. Therefore, the presence of a
checking and informing press can aid in curbing abuses of power or alert us to
indiscretions perpetrated by those who are outside of the political process. Jus-
tice Jackson addressed this issue in his dissent to Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944):
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There is also a history of press access to military operations.
The government has permitted, and even invited, the press to be
present in most situations involving armed conflict since the Civil
War.104 The government has also regularly briefed the press, dis-
closing significant data concerning war efforts. This traditional
access, however, has always been qualified and subject to fairly
strict governmental regulation. Military officials have always with-
held some information on strategic grounds; the press has always
been excluded from certain secret operations; and members of
the press corps have always been subject to significant restraints
on their movements within the theater of operations.10  Thus,
although a tradition of openness associated with military affairs
exists to some extent, it lacks the breadth and consistency of the
tradition of openness surrounding criminal trials, the importance
of which was stressed by the Court in Richmond Newspapers.
Furthermore, although there are no specific legislative find-
ings supporting the current Pentagon restraints on access,' 06 the
government can summon strong and fairly specific arguments for
If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible
and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its re-
straint. The chief restraint upon those who command the physical
forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their respon-
sibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the
moral judgments of history.
Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
104. For a discussion of the extent of press access during prior military
conflicts, see Gottschalk, supra note 59 and accompanying text.
105. For further discussion of media access during military operations, see
Cassell, supra note 59; Gottschalk, supra note 59; Homonoff, The First Amendment
and National Security: The Constitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial During
Military Operations, 17 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 369, 369-83 (1985).
106. Indeed, to the extent there are legislative "findings" on point, they
seem to weigh more in favor of the press than the government. For example, as
Justices Douglas observed in his concurrence in New York Times, the Espionage
Act of 1950, in amending 18 U.S.C. § 793, states in § 1(b):
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require, or establish
military or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon
freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States and no regulation shall be promulgated having that
effect.
403 U.S. 713, 722 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing 64 Stat. 987).
Moreover, after the Grenada invasion in 1983, Congress passed a resolution
declaring its view that the press should be guaranteed the ability to report on
military ventures:
Since a free press is an essential feature of our democratic system of
government and since currently in Lebanon, and traditionally in the
past, the United States has allowed the press to cover conflicts involv-
ing United States armed forces, restrictions imposed upon the press in
Grenada shall cease. For the purposes of this section, "restrictions"
shall include:
1546
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the contention that in times of war it has compelling reasons for
at least partially closing the gates of press access. There are, in
any war, times when the need for speed or secrecy dictates exclu-
sion of the press. 0 7 Information on military strategy, intelli-
gence, tactical strength and deployment are all potentially
extremely sensitive. 08 Given the long history of Supreme Court
(1) preventing the press from freely accessing news sources of its
choice;
(2) unreasonably limiting the number or representation of the
press permitted to enter Grenada; and
(3) unreasonably limiting freedom of unsupervised movement of
the press in Grenada.
Provided, however, that nothing in their [sic] resolution shall be
construed to require any action which jeopardizes the safety or security
of U.S. or allied forces or citizen [sic] in Grenada.
129 CONG. REC. 29,946-47 (1983), reprinted in Cassell, supra note 59, at 944
n.101. Nothing further, however, came of this proposal.
In his New York Times concurrence, Justice Stewart commented on the issue
of access versus censorship. He acknowledged that the Executive Branch did
have the power to preserve national security by restricting access to government
secrets. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). However, he
warned that "the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the
areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citi-
zenry-in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect
the values of democratic government." Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). Accord-
ingly, he cautioned that executive control over the disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation required "judgment and wisdom of a high order." Id. at 729 (Stewart, J,
concurring). He suggested:
[A] very first principle of that wisdom would be an insistence upon
avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified,
then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disre-
garded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by those
intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short,
that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be
the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be
preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.
lId (Stewart, J., concurring).
107. For example, during World War II, there was no press present at the
Battle of the Bulge, Midway, or the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima. Cas-
sell, supra note 59, at 939-42. During Vietnam, the press was likewise excluded
from certain missions such as the rescue attempts at the Son Tay POW camps
and the bombing raids into Cambodia and Laos. Id. There are, however, exam-
ples of open access to important events, such as the invasion of IowaJima and D-
Day, and reporters in most cases had an almost unlimited amount of access dur-
ing Vietnam. Id.
108. Throughout military history, "intelligence" and other matters of strat-
egy and planning have been regarded as requiring extreme security. Although
the modern age might view him as an extremist, Sun Tzu, the classical Chinese
general, regarded the secret handling of delicate matters so essential that "if
plans relating to secret operations were prematurely divulged the agent and all
those to whom he spoke of them" would be put to death, so as to preserve the
secrets. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR, 147 (1963). Modern strategists still regard
"intelligence" to require security: "From the point of view of military command
intelligence and communications are vital throughout the whole structure." H.
ECCLES, MILITARY CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHY 193-94 (1965). Eccles also cau-
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deference to the military,' 09 there is considerable reason to be-
lieve that these arguments would receive a sympathetic hearing,
especially in the current Court. While they do not justify wholesale
exclusion of the press, they do suggest that perhaps generals
should have more discretion to exclude members of the press
from certain facets of warfare than trial judges should have to ex-
dude the press from criminal proceedings.
Comparison with Richmond Newspapers thus yields, at most, a
reasonably strong argument for only a qualified right of access to
warfare information. To deny any right of access at all would be
to permit the military, if it wished, to exclude the media entirely
from wartime coverage. That would strike too severe a blow at
self-government. To grant an expansive right of press access,
however, could seriously jeopardize national security interests.
Moreover, it would substantially enhance the government's claim
that its only recourse to protect those interests would be a broad-
based system of prior restraints. Extension of one first amend-
ment right would paradoxically threaten retraction of another,
more fundamental freedom.
It is perhaps curious, given the frequency with which we go
tions, however, that "true security can be jeopardized by the overclassification of
nonessentials." Id. at 198.
109. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (govern-
ment "can act to protect substantial interests by imposing reasonable restric-
tions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the
First Amendment"); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Air Force regula-
tions requiring members of that service to obtain approval from their com-
manders before circulating petitions on Air Force bases upheld because of
governmental interest in discipline); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (base
commanding officer may restrict partisan political speeches and demonstrations
which he perceives to clearly endanger loyalty, discipline or morale of troops
under his command); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967) (Congress
may punish symbolic protest-burning of Selective Service registration card);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Congress has power to punish
distribution of circulars which encourage men called and accepted for military
service to obstruct draft); see aho Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S.
500 (1988) (state tort law which would impose liability for design defects in mili-
tary equipment is displaced where judgment against contractor would threaten
discretionary function of government); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1988)(in deference to Congress's judgments, Court ruled that Military Selective Ser-
vice Act's registration provisions do not violate fifth amendment by requiring
only males to register for draft); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)(military regulation forbidding wearing of yarmulke is reasonable and even-
handed in pursuing military's need for uniformity and does not violate first
amendment); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (United States is not
liable under Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to members of the armed
forces sustained while on active duty and resulting from negligence of others in
armed forces).
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to war, 10 that the issue of wartime press access has never been
litigated to a final decision. This could be due, at least in part, to
the somewhat surprising amount of government cooperation re-
garding press access during most prior military operations. As
noted, during World War II, Korea and even Vietnam, the gov-
ernment was generally quite open with the press, both in its per-
mission to reporters to be "on the scene," and in the data it
disclosed during press briefings." '
The government's attitude changed, however, after Viet-
nam.112 Military policymakers were unprepared for the adverse
public reaction that resulted when media reporting, for the first
time, brought the graphic realities of wartime bloodshed into the
living rooms of America. Since then, there appears to have been
a reaction in the military against this historic policy of openness.
Press complaints after Grenada prompted the Pentagon to con-
duct an internal study of the question of media access and to
promise reforms. The result, known as the Sidle Report, pro-
posed a "pool" system that would guarantee some press access
yet give military officials the power to limit press involvement, es-
pecially in the early stages of an offensive action."t 3 This pool
110. During the twentieth century, the United States has been involved in
five major conflicts, plus numerous minor military episodes. In the past decade
alone, Americans have resorted to military force on at least five occasions: in
Lebanon, Panama, Grenada, Libya and the Persian Gulf.
111. See Cassell, supra note 59, at 937- 43 (discussion of military policy vis-i-
vis the press during World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War).
112. For a discussion of the military's disenchantment with their policy on
press access in wartime and the development of the "pool" system, see supra
notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
113. In November of 1983, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen-
eral Vessey, posed the question of how the military "could conduct military op-
erations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military and protects the
security of the operation while keeping the American public informed through
the media?" to a panel chaired by retired Major General Winant Sidle and com-
prised of military officers, representatives from journalism schools and retired
journalists. Note, supra note 65, at 879 n.44. Their answer was the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Media-Military Relations Panel Report (Sidle Report). In the
report, the panel provided eight recommendations:
1) Public affairs planning for military operations should be conducted
concurrently with operational planning.
2) If pooling of reporters is necessary to ensure early access to an
operation, plans should be made for the largest possible pooling proce-
dure to be in place for the minimum time possible.
3) The Secretary of Defense should study whether to create a pre-
established list of accredited correspondents in case of a military opera-
tion for which a pool is required.
4) The basic tenet governing media access to military operations
should be voluntary compliance by the media with security guidelines
or ground rules established and issued by the military.
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system, with some further amendments adopted after the invasion
of Panama, was essentially the one implemented during Opera-
tion Desert Storm. 14 There was more press access in the Persian
Gulf than in the two previous military escapades, but in contrast
to other major military efforts like Korea and Vietnam, many sea-
soned veterans of the press corps expressed frustration at the re-
straints on access to which they were subjected." l 5
If the Court today were explicitly to acknowledge a right of
5) Public affairs planning for military operations should include suffi-
cient equipment and qualified military personnel to help correspon-
dents cover the operation.
6) Communications facilities should be made available to the media as
soon as feasible, but these communications must not interfere with
combat and combat support operations.
7) Intra- and inter-theatre transportation should be made available to
the media.
8) Media-military understanding should be promoted by meeting and
educational programs.
Cassell, supra note 59, at 946 (paraphrasing Sidle Report). For the complete text
of this report, see Note, supra note 65, at app. I.
114. For the full text of the guidelines and ground rules used during Desert
Storm, see Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp.
1558, 1575-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (apps. A-C, Guidelines for News Media; app. D,
Centcom Pool Membership and Operating Procedures; and app. E, Operation Desert Shield
Ground Rules) (these appendices include all subsequent changes in ground rules
and regulations issued after the initiation of hostilities).
For Judge Sand's discussion of the history of these pool regulations, their
subsequent modifications and the necessity of being in the pool to gain access,
see id. at 1563-65.
115. Intent on avoiding the Desert Storm kind of pool system in any future
coverage of a military conflict, representatives of 15 major news agencies sent a
letter to Defense Secretary Cheney, criticizing the pool system and asserting that
"the flow of information to the public was blocked, impeded or diminished."
DeParle, supra, note 25, at A9, col. 1.
Surprisingly, after the war had concluded, General Schwarzkopf, Pete Wil-
liams, the chief spokesperson for the Pentagon, and White House Press Secre-
tary Marlin Fitzwater admitted that the press pools were unsatisfactory and that
the rules were "overly restrictive." Id. This does not necessarily mean, how-
ever, that the military has any plans of completely rejecting the pooling system.
Indeed, Brigadier General Richard Neal of the Marine Corps believes that "the
pooling system is here to stay." Id.
There is also at least some support in Congress for restrictive treatment of
the press. Senator Lieberman commented that "restriction on news coverage
was absolutely necessary in order to protect the lives of our troops, and in order
to increase the odds of military success." Sheridan, supra, note 25, at 52.
Others, like Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, believe that it was only the particular circumstances of this war
which allowed the pooling system to operate so effectively for as long as it did.
What Next? Second Thoughts on Restrictions, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1991, at A9, col. 5.
According to Representative Aspin, most of the original fighting was done in the
air and most casualties occurred behind enemy lines, but if the war had been
protracted or had large numbers of Coalition casualties, the pooling system
would have collapsed. Id.
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access during military operations in response to a press challenge
to the military's current system, it seems clear that such a right
inevitably should be subject to significant governmental regula-
tion.11 6 The government should be permitted some latitude to
limit the "time, place and manner" of access, and it should have
some ability to control the content of required disclosure.' 1 7 The
right of access, however, would be worth little unless the Court
were careful to define the scope of these permitted regulations in
fairly narrow and precise terms.' 18 The issue then becomes one
of defining the type and scope of permissible regulation.
First, the military should be entitled to enforce reasonable
"time, place and manner" restraints on the press. The Court, of
course, has long recognized that restraints of this type do not of-
fend the first amendment. " 9 The need for such regulations dur-
116. See Developments in the Law: The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties,
85 HARv. L. REV. 1130, 1244 (1972) (detailed discussion of relationship between
first amendment and national security interests).
117. For examples of permissible governmental time, place and manner re-
strictions, see Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37 (1983) (state may restrict use of school property for intended use so long as
such restriction is not effort to suppress expression which is contrary to public
officials' point of view); compare Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus,
482 U.S. 569 (1987) (airport's ban on all first amendment activities at central
terminal held invalid on overbreadth grounds; restriction went further than reg-
ulation of expressive activity which might cause congestion problems or interfer-
ence with airport activities). See also Matheson, The Prosecutor, the Press and Free
Speech, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 865 (1990) (discussing limitations on first amend-
ment's protection of lawyers' extrajudicial speech); Stone, Fora Americana: Speech
in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233 (examining status of individuals' right of
access to non-mass communication channels and other types of fora); Kalven,
The Concept of Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1965) (exam-
ining Supreme Court's shift in attitude towards protests and relationship to first
amendment); Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum: The High School
Student's Right to Free Speech, 72 GEo. LJ. 135 (1983) (arguing that first amend-
ment protects student-initiated religious speech in public secondary schools in
same way that it protects speech in public universities).
118. The need for strict judicial limitation on the scope of permitted regu-
lations is demonstrated by the view of senior Pentagon officials that press inter-
ests are subservient to military effectiveness. As Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
put it: "Bottom line is you've got to accomplish your mission. You've got to do
what it takes at the lowest possible cost in terms of American lives. And that
takes precedence over how you deal with the press." What Next? Second Thoughts
on Restrictions, supra note 115, at A9, col. 5. This attitude is understandable, per-
haps even commendable, in view of the military's awesome responsibilities dur-
ing wartime. But it is also a sure sign of the military tendency to over-regulate
the press and under-value free speech in times of national emergency.
119. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1988) (city-is-
sued guidelines for use of public bandshell valid as they did not infringe upon
performers' content and were geared towards controlling noise); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (prohibiting soldier from wearing yarmulke
when in uniform was not infringement of first amendment as Air Force guide-
15511991]
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ing wartime is apparent. As far back as the Civil War, reporters
sometimes got in the way of troops and impeded military opera-
tions.1 20 In the Persian Gulf, there were literally thousands of re-
porters from countless news organizations swarming around our
forces. Their mere presence presented military officials with ad-
ditional logistical factors to consider that, at best, were a nui-
sance, and, at worst, posed a significant risk to the efficiency and
success of military operations.' 2 ' To prevent undue interference
with military operations, military officials thus must exercise some
power to direct the size, location and movements of the press
corps. 1
22
lines on visible headgear were reasonably and evenhandedly applied in interest
of uniformity); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I
(1986) (forcing company to allow opposing points of view on billing envelopes
infringed on company's choice of what not to say); United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675 (1985) (military base is not public forum; denial of entry onto base
does not violate first amendment); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (restriction on distribution, sales and
solicitation to that done at fixed booths at state fair, where booths were rented in
non-discriminatory manner, is permissible); Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city zoning ordinance restricting placement of adult
theatres in interest of regulating commercial use of property did not infringe on
protected communication); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)
(city ordinance prohibiting willful noisemaking or distractions near school dur-
ing school hours did not impermissibly infringe on expressive activity); Adderly
v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (state anti-trespass statute aimed only at malicious
or intentionally mischievous trespass activity, as applied to demonstrators on
county-jail property not open to public, not unconstitutional); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) (restrictions on use of "loud and raucous" sound truck not
unconstitutionally vague); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (state
may constitutionally require and charge for license for parade or procession on
public street).
120. See Cassell, supra note 59, at 933-35 (discussion of press-military inter-
action during wartime from Revolutionary War to Civil War).
121. According to Colonel Bill Mulvey, the JIB director in Dhahran: "Hav-
ing reporters running around (the front] would overwhelm the battlefield."
Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front, supra note 23, at 45.
122. The pooling system in force during Operation Desert Storm was
based on a version of the earlier Sidle Report. During Operation Desert Storm,
participation in the pool system was limited to "media that principally serve the
American public and that have had a long-term presence covering Department
of Defense military operations." Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of De-
fense, 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Pools were of two types: eight-
een-man for ground combat operations; and seven-man pools for ground
combat "and other coverage." Id. at 1565. Once selected for a pool, media
members were required to then register with the JIB, which then assigned es-
corts who accompanied and directed the pools to pre-approved sites. Id. For
the full text of the guidelines, see id. at appendices A-E.
Without a doubt, some regulations are necessary-not only to protect mili-
tary interests, but also to safeguard the press from the enemy. The capture of
CBS correspondent Bob Simon, after he broke from the pool system, serves as a
prime example of how the military guidelines were in fact helpful in protecting
1552 [Vol. 36: p. 1513
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Even at the level of time, place and manner restraints, how-
ever, there must be some limits on discretion. The Grenada affair
demonstrates the risk of overbreadth-surely total exclusion of
the press from the Grenada assault was unjustified. Management
of the press pools in the Persian Gulf also hints at the possible
hidden dangers of content-oriented bias in an apparently neutral
time, place or manner restraint. According to the lawsuits that
were filed, the military in the Persian Gulf gave preference to "es-
tablishment" news organizations over the "alternative" press.123
This preference-perhaps not so coincidentally-tended to cut
off access for reporters who represented some of the news organi-
zations that were most critical of the war effort. Whether the re-
sult was intended or not, some reporters felt this was further
evidence that the press pools were being manipulated to guaran-
tee favorable accounts of the war.1 24
Second, a right of access necessarily would be subject to
some government control over the content of information dis-
closed. There is undoubtedly much that military officials could
disclose about their activities without jeopardizing operations.' 25
our media. Zoglin,Jumping Out of the Pool, supra note 26, at 39 (brief account of
disappearance and capture of Bob Simon).
123. The guidelines permitted only major television networks, radio net-
works "that served a general listening audience," major wire services, major na-
tional newsmagazines "that serve a general news function," and major
newspapers "that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation
Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and have had a
continuous or near-continuous presence... since the early stages of the opera-
tion." Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1578-79 (Appendix D). Thus, any publi-
cation that did not fit into the military's definition of "major" could not be a part
of any pool. The military, however, never issued a standard by which "major"
was measured (e.g., "any publication with circulation over one million"). Exclu-
sion from these pools inevitably carried a bias against publications advocating
minority viewpoints on the war.
124. Some members of the press complained: "[Tihe most important
power the military exercised was the decision over where to send the pools....[This] turned officers into assignment editors, determining story lines by dictat-
ing what reporters could see." DeParle, supra note 25, at A9, col. 1; see also
Wicker, "Marketing" the War, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1991, at A23, col. 5 (veteran
reporter complained that "the government succeeded ... in censorship by ac-
cess and delay"; "the military did not have to 'manufacture' news to control
information going out to Americans at home").
125. Information that could be disclosed includes both information that
lacks strategic significance and information that, though strategically important,
is probably already known by the enemy. For first amendment purposes, access
to the latter category is probably more important, because strategically relevant
information contributes more to the process of self-government. The challenge
is to evaluate very carefully objective evidence bearing on the question of
whether the enemy already knows the information in question.
Walter Cronkite told an anecdote of being censored from publishing a story
about the Allies successfully bombing Germany through heavy cloud cover.
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There is, however, some data that, in any kind of warfare, must be
secret. The most ardent supporters of "government in the sun-
shine"-broad public access to governmental affairs-would, I
trust, exempt the wartime military from at least the harshest rays
of public scrutiny. In Operation Desert Storm, for example, even
our most forthright military officials repeatedly had to refuse on
strategic grounds to answer some of the more probing questions
at press briefings. 126 We would not want to force General
Schwarzkopf to announce his strategy on public television or de-
fend his decision to make a "surprise" attack in a press confer-
ence held a day before the beginning of the assault. It would be
an absurdity to think that war could be conducted on those
terms.12 7
Yet, this form of control would have to be even more care-
fully defined than the time, place and manner restraints discussed
above. Content-based restraints are generally disfavored under
the first amendment. 128 Like prior restraints, content-based re-
Cronkite, supra note 32, at 43. He was not permitted to send the story until he
pointed out that the Germans on the ground already knew that we possessed
such capabilities. Id. "The truth was not being withheld from the Germans, but
Americans." Id. Likewise, it would not have made sense if the JIB had censored
a story on our ability to drop a bomb down a smokestack, for the Iraqis, if any-
body, would know in no uncertain terms that we could do that. For a discussion
of the function of the JIB, see Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1565.
126. A typical response to questions of this nature ran along the lines of
"I[f) we tell-tell you that we're telling Saddam Hussein that .... So we don't
want to go into it any more deeply than I have." Defense Dep't Regular Briefing,
Federal News Service, Feb. 20, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, FEDNEW file) (quot-
ing Lt. General Thomas Kelly).
Richard Solant, former president of CBS News, defended the press's role in
the briefing process, though recognizing that, by asking "often contentious,
sometimes impolite questions," the press can look like "bullies." Zoglin,Just
Whose Side Are They On, TIME, Feb. 25, 1991, at 53. According to Solant: "People
don't understand that briefings are a negotiation process." Id.
127. It is an equal absurdity, however, to imagine a press "briefing" in
which no information of military significance is disclosed. As ChiefJustice Bur-
ger said: "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their insti-
tutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1981).
Operation Desert Storm occasionally brought us a bit too close to that ab-
surdity for comfort. On one occasion, for example, General Colin Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held a press conference in which he pur-
ported to demonstrate the decline in Iraqi radar activity resulting from Coalition
bombing. Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front, supra, note 23 at 44. He used
charts that were supposed to show the decline, but all the numbers had been
removed. Id. He then deflected questions seeking more specifics by saying
"Trust me." Id. In effect, the only support at this and other similar briefings for
the Pentagon's assertion that the bombing raids had been successful was the
Pentagon's assertion that the bombing raids had been successful.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) ("[I]f
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strictions allow the government too much power to control the
flow of public opinion.129 Thus, although the sensitivity of mili-
tary operations dictates a need for substantial military discretion
over the content of disclosures, some limit on content-based ac-
cess restraints would be essential. Otherwise, the "exceptions" to
the right of access we are contemplating would be so broad that
they could effectively swallow the rule.
One problem the courts would have to face in crafting the
scope of these qualifications is the problem of mootness. In war-
fare events often move swiftly and the moment when access is
needed is quickly gone.' 30 In view of these difficulties, courts
should, I believe, recognize that claims of access are of the type
known as "capable of repetition yet evading review" 13' for which
the strict requirement of an immediate "live controversy" should
be relaxed.' 3 2 Our nation's history sadly teaches us that military
attacks and reprisals are steadily recurring events, that the issues
of press access possess common attributes in war after war, and
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prohibiting advertising of drug prices
was held unconstitutional because state's goal was achieved "by keeping people
in ignorance").
129. "Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would
completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.'" Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
130. The dismissal of Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
was predicated on this very point. The "war" in Grenada ran its full course in
just under two months, the absolute press ban occupying only the first two days
(the period in which American forces crushed whatever resistance Grenada
ground forces had been able to muster), and the last month (at which time
American forces had total control of the island) being completely free of any
restrictions. Thus, when the suit came before the federal court one and a half
years later, the court ruled that the issues were no longer "live" and dismissed
the claims for both declarative and injunctive relief. Id. at 135.
131. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
132. Compare Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (court
concluded case was moot due to swift completion of war) with Nation Magazine
v. United States Dep't of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (even
though fighting had stopped, Court recognized issue before it as capable of rep-
etition; case dismissed on other grounds). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975) (acceptance of "second-best" plaintiff for issue at hand; question of de-
gree of controversy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (same); Meese v. Keene,
481 U.S. 465 (1987) (relaxing question of attenuation of injury; question of con-
creteness of controversy); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (same). For
a general discussion of the concept of mootness, see Bandes, The Idea of a Case,
42 STAN. L. REV. 227 (1989-90); Greenstein, Mootness in Class Actions, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 897 (1982-83).
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that the same parties will be subject to military restraints on ac-
cess in each succeeding conflict.
Nor should courts follow the ruling in Nation Magazine that
the issues at stake are too "abstract" to be decided by an article
III court. 33 To be sure, some of the specifics of time, place, man-
ner and content restraints must be resolved in the context of a
particular military operation. The obligation of the government
itself -to guarantee a qualified right of access, however, has yet to
be decided. That issue is no less real and no more abstract than
the obligation of a trial judge to let the press into a courtroom to
observe a criminal trial. That issue has persisted now through at
least three military conflicts, and there is, in the history of those
episodes and the wars that preceded them, ample evidence from
which a court could make an informed judgment about the over-
arching constitutional question. 3 4
The complaints in Nation Magazine focused more sharply on
these issues of access than they did on questions of censorship. I
think, however, that the case was originally brought because some
members of the press believed that a promise of access, which
historically had been the quid pro quo for voluntary submission
to censorship, 3 5 had been substantially breached by the military's
stingy approach to access in the Persian Gulf. This feeling was
particularly acute among reporters who were not part of the press
establishment, who felt that the "pool" system discriminated
against them in favor of larger news organizations that main-
tained cozy relations with the Pentagon.13 6 They believed that
133. Judge Sand concluded:
[Tihis Court cannot now determine that some limitation on the number
ofjournalists granted access to a battlefield in the next overseas military
operation may not be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction,
valid under the First and Fifth Amendments. Since we find the issues as
here presented to be too abstract and conjectural forjudicial resolution
the Court, on this ground, grants Department of Defense's motion to
dismiss the complaint.
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1562.
134. See Cassell, supra note 59, at 969-73 (discussion of trade-off between
censorship and access).
135. For a discussion of the historical "access for censorship bargain," see
supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
136. Because they were not classified as "major" media and had not been in
Saudi Arabia from the start of hostilities, The Nation Magazine, Harper's Maga-
zine, In These Times, Pacific News Service, The Guardian, The Progressive,
Mother Jones, The L.A. Weekly, The Village Voice, The Texas Observer,
Pacifica Radio News, Sydney H. Schanberg, E.L. Doctorow, William Styron,
Michael Klare and Scott Armstrong were excluded from the pools as per the
JIB's guidelines. Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1558. Once rejected, they
brought suit against the Department of Defense. Id.
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the government had failed to live up to its part of an implicit
bargain.
As noted before, legal action against the pool system went
nowhere because the ground offensive was over so shortly after it
was begun. It is fair to say, however, that many members of the
press at least feel that the era of press-military cooperation is
coming to an end. Unless the military relaxes its policies on ac-
cess, or unless Congress intervenes to specify more open rules for
press access during military ventures, the next military undertak-
ing seems sure to bring with it another constitutional challenge.
IV. CONCLUSION
What is curious about this battle between the press and the
military is that each side seems to want something it is not clearly
entitled to under the Constitution. The military wants censorship
that is anathema to first amendment values. 3 7 The press wants a
right of access that lacks a solid first amendment pedigree.' 3 8 In
"go for broke" constitutional litigation, both sides stand to lose
an important privilege they have long enjoyed.
Nor is it immediately clear that constitutional analysis can
replicate the historic press-military "bargain." To do so, the
Court would have to hold that broad access with broad censor-
ship is a "less restrictive alternative" to no access with very lim-
ited censorship. That conclusion is not indefensible, but it is also
by no means intuitively obvious. Indeed, it turns the traditional
belief that controlled disclosure is less restrictive than direct press
regulation on its head.'3 9 What is functionally less restrictive is
theoretically more so and vice versa. The traditional values of the
first amendment, in this particular context, yield a paradox.
When, in other areas of law, precedent is uncertain or nonex-
istent, current principles seem to yield functionally undesirable
results, stakes are extremely high, and the need for a dependable
solution is great, the alternatives to judicial resolution of a con-
137. For a discussion of the military's attempts to censor certain informa-
tion during Operation Desert Storm, see supra notes 25-28 & 65-70 and accom-
panying text.
138. For a discussion of the constitutional foundations upon which the
press had based its claim of a right of access to cover wartime events, see supra
notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the Court's constitutional concerns in the "con-
trolled disclosure" context in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 488 U.S. 887 (1989), see
supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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troversy tend to grow in their appeal.140 This is the kind of situa-
tion in which a seasoned litigator might well recommend to his
client (on either side) that the parties meet at the bargaining ta-
ble, "get to yes" 141 and reach an out-of-court settlement. Indeed,
the judicial "decisions not to decide" in Flynt and Nation Magazine
may well contain as an unwritten subtext the suggestion that the
press and the Pentagon would be much better off resolving their
differences out of court. This is not to say that the courts lack the
power to resolve the dispute. Nor is it to say that there is not an
answer under the first amendment. Rather, it betokens the recog-
nition, repeatedly voiced by the dissenters in New York Times, that
"great cases" can make "bad law," a warning prudent actors in
this on-going drama would be well advised to heed.1 42
In the wake of Operation Desert Storm, it seems fair to assert
that our nation has seldom been more secure. Military success
has brought with it supreme public confidence in our ability to
protect American interests in the international arena. 143 The
war's portent for our domestic civil liberties, however, is less cer-
tain. The sharp conflict between the press and the Pentagon over
rights of the press during wartime is unlikely to vanish like a mi-
rage on the sands of the Arabian desert. Unless there is a signifi-
cant change of position on either or both sides of this dispute, the
Court may be forced to resolve it in our next military episode. If
forced to do so, I think it is safe to say that the Court will find the
commands of the first amendment in this particular area anything
but easy to apply.
140. See generally A.D.R.: An Innovative Approach to Solving Problems Efficiently,
51 Tnx. BARJ. No. 12 (1988) (special issue on Alternative Dispute Resolution).
141. See R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (manual on advantages of and tactics for negotiated
settlement).
142. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. President Bush, upon the Allies' definitive defeat of the Iraqi forces,
proclaimed: "Well, it's a proud day for America and by God we've kicked the
Vietnam Syndrome once and for all." World News Tonight With Peter Jennings
(ABC television broadcast, Mar. 1, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, ABCNEW file)(referring to the belief that any large-scale American military intervention
abroad was doomed to a drawn-out and embarrassing defeat).
There are, however, those who are now wary of an Iraqi Syndrome-the
belief that the revitalized American war machine is invincible and should serve
as a world-wide super-cop against any aggressions. Rep. John Lewis (D. Ga.)
put it pithily: "I hope we don't get used to war being so easy. War is not a cure-
all." Dionne, Vietnam Syndrome, supra note 88, at Al, col. 1.
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